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FOREWORD
Writing a thesis generates two things: learning and debts. Others shall be the judges of the
amount of learning produced, but I know for a fact that the debts accumulated are substantial.
So while the rest of the thesis is about learning, I devote this section to debts. In trying to list
my debts I shall make no attempt to rank them by size or any other criterion, since it is hard to
tind a scale that would apply to both the time and attention I have stolen from Hege and my
two sons, as well as to the attention and advice I have received from colleagues. What I shall
do in the following is therefore merely to document my debts. and hopefully the future will
bring chances to repay them.
I start by noting that lowe much to the chairman of my dissertation committee, Christine B.
Meyer. I thank her for continued support and for having faith when progress was slow (for
example during the 1,5 years it took to get the data I wanted/needed). I also thank her for
many valuable discussions before this thesis was written, during its writing, and hopefully
many more to come now that it has been completed. Sadly, Christine was absent during some
of the critical stages ofwriting. For reasons incomprehensible to me Christine chose to serve
as a junior minister in the Norwegian cabinet over following the day to day progress of my
work. I can only hope that the Norwegian electorate will appreciate this monumental sacrifice.
This leads me to the person who has influenced the final result the most Professor Nicolai J.
Foss at Copenhagen Business School. He has influenced my work on many levels. Most
generally through my admiration for his own writing, but more directly for two other reasons.
One being that he accepted to let me come to CBS for 6 months, a period during which the
basic ideas in this thesis were developed (after he showed me the folly of some other ideas I
was pursuing at the time). The other is of course that in Christines absence he has been the de
facto principal advisor. This does not mean that he can be held accountable for the many
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shortcomings I am sure still exist but it does mean that without his insightful comments and
advice the shortcomings would have been bigger and more numerous.
Nicolai also introduced me to Peter G. Klein of the University of Missouri, without whom this
thesis could not have been produced. Peter managed to get me the data I needed. In addition
Peter has become a close collaborator. and a person who has engaged me in some extremely
valuable discussions. in particular with respect to the first paper. I'm happy knowing that our
collaboration will continue also with respect to the three other papers. and all four of them
will eventually be published jointly. Peter is not only one of the smartest persons I have ever
met. he is also extremely nice to interact with. both via nightly E-mails and tete-a-tete.
A long time collaborator who has also influenced this work is Erik W. Jakobsen. His
influence is both direct through the valuable comments he has given along the way. but also
indirect. because discussions with him on a wide variety of intellectual subjects have
profoundly shaped (and sharpened) my way ofthinking and writing.
The last member ofmy dissertation committee is Sven Haugland. who also supplied valuable
comments to each of the papers. In fact.just as I am writing these very words. more
comments from Sven are arriving on E-mail. I thank him for all of them.
Another extremely important contributor is Olav Kvitastein. Completing the analyses
contained in this thesis required overcoming some rather difficult programming challenges in
SPSS. Olav Kvitastein taught me about the mysteries of creating syntaxes in SPSS. and when
I at ane point encountered a problem I didn't know how to salve. Olav found a way to solve
it. This particular problem was so complex that even with his enormous skills in this area it
took him about six weeks to solve it so we are not talking about small favors here.l
Fortunately for me. I think cracking this problem became a question ofprofessional pride for
him. something I cynically exploited.
l There is probably no one more knowledgeable about SPSS programming inNorway than Olav Kvitastein.
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I would also like to thank Tor Øyvind Baardsen for having the patience to listen to my
problems and frustrations along the way. It has always impressed me how he can grasp the
most complex and detailed issues of my work standing in the hallway for a few minutes. and
respond with insightful and valuable advice. I would almost describe it as irritating how he
can absorb what may have taken me severalmonths of thinking - over a cup of coffee. In
addition to being the one person I could discuss things with on a daily basis, Tor Øyvind took
over some of my teaching duties at a critical point. This gave me the opportunity to focus my
attention in the final stages of writing. lowe him a lot.
In addition to those already mentioned. I would also like to thank Erik Døving. Arne
Kalleberg, "Leder gruppen", participants at the Nordic Workshop in Transaction Cost
Economics, and the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (for
financial support).
Finally. I would like to apologize to my two sons for being overly absorbed with work for
some time. Although my behavior in the recent past may not reflect it. I consider the
importance of completing this thesis as negligible compared to their well-being. The only
defense I have for these priorities is my knowledge that the best mother in the world has been
taking care ofthem. So I would like to devote these last few words I write to Hege. and thank
her for taking care of all the things I should have done. and for being there for me both when I
was at home - and when I was not.
I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my brother, Jan Christian Lien.
Lasse B. Lien
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
Bergen. June 2003
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KEY CONCEPTS
The Survivor Principle
The survivor principle is the assumption that the quest for economic profit combined
with selection forces in competitive markets. ensures that a sample of firms in
competitive markets will ret1ect choices and behaviors that are efficient. We refer to
paper number one (p. 27) for a more thorough discussion of the origins. uses and
versions of the survivor principle.
Corporate Diversification
Corporate diversification in the sense used here is the question ofwhich industries a
diversified finn should combine within its portfolio. and the study of the detenninants
and consequences of such decisions. We refer to paper number two (p. 61) for a more
comprehensive introduction to key issues in this field of research.
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INTRODUCTION
1. Research Questions
The present thesis is about the relationship between the survivor principle and corporate
diversification. This relationship is explored in two different ways. One is about what
corporate diversification can do for the survivor principle: the other is about what the survivor
principle can do for corporate diversification.
Let us first focus on what corporate diversification can do for the survivor principle
(henceforth: SP). The SP. although widely used as an assumption in empirical tests. does not
itself rest on a firm empirical footing. In fact there does not seem to exist any explicit
attempts to empirically test the SP. This is both problematic - and of considerable importance
- because it means that a large part of existing empirical knowledge relies crucially on an
untested assumption - namely that the SP is valid. Accordingly. what we suggest corporate
diversification (and this thesis) has to offer the SP is a first direct test of its empirical validity.
Although one empirical test alone cannot eliminate this concern. not in terms of relying on the
SP in research on corporate diversification. and certainly not in other fields of research. it
does represent a first attempt at falsification. Hence. it constitutes a first step in the direction
of establishing an empirical basis for employing the SP in empirical studies. The first research
question is therefore the following:
Does data FOll1 corporate diversification support the validity of empirical strategies
that rely on the survivor principle?
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Now. let us turn to what the SP can offer research on corporate diversification. Assuming that
the SP is not demonstrably invalid. it may be potentially useful for overcoming one of the key
challenges in research on corporate diversification: how to empirically capture the degree of
relatedness between businesses in a corporate portfolio. In research on corporate
diversification (within the field of strategic management) no other independent variable has
been given the theoretical and empirical attention awarded to the issue of relatedness
(Chatterjee and Wernerfelt 1991: Robins and Wiersma. 1995. 2003). Yet there is widespread
disenchantment with the lack of convergence between theoretical predictions and empirical
findings (Hoskisson and Hitt. 1990: Markides and Williamson. 1994. 1996: Reed and
Luffman. 1986). Under normal circumstances such a lack of consistent empirical support for
theoretical predictions would presumably build a pressure towards revisions of theory. In
research on corporate diversification the basic theoretical predictions have to a surprising
degree withstood the onslaught from poor empirical performance. because there seems to be
wide agreement that the measurement procedures used to capture relatedness suffer from
serious deficiencies (Hoskisson and Hitt 1990: Markides and Williamson 1994: Robins and
Wiersma. 1995). So instead of focusing efforts on revisions of theory.2 researchers have
ventured on a search for better ways to measure relatedness (Fan and Lang. 2000; Farjoun,
1994: Markides and Williamson. 1996; Robins and Wiersma. 1995; Silverman. 1999). This
behavior indicates that the community of research seems to put relatively more faith in the
soundness of the basic theoretical arguments than in the empirical findings in this area of
research.
This is where the SP may contribute to the research on corporate diversification. If valid. the
SP may be used to derive empirical measures of relatedness. However. if the SP is to be
useful for this purpose - it must be able to demonstrably outperform the conventional way of
2 Certainly this is not to say that there is no theoretical work being done, but rather to point out that the mixed
empirical findings have not led to the profound theoretical revisions one might have expected. Instead theoretical
developments seem mainly to build on and extend existing theory.
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measuring relatedness.' Our contribution is to evaluate whether this seems to be the case.
Given the centrality of the relatedness variable in research on corporate diversification. and
the noted dissatisfaction with existing measures. such a contribution should be of some
interest.4 Particularly because the survivor-based approach is profoundly different from all the
alternatives. The second research question is therefore the following:
Do relatedness measures based on the SP outperform the conventional measurement
procedures!
The reader may be entertaining an uneasy feeling of tautological reasoning at this stage. The
arguments above beg the question of whether the answer to the second question is not implied
by the first. The answer to this is no. Support (or lack of falsification) for the SP as an
empirical strategy does not necessarily imply that relatedness measures based on the SP
represent a demonstrable improvement over conventional measures. The reverse, on the other
hand is impossible. If the SP is falsified as an empirical strategy for theory testing, it is
obviously not valid for deriving empirical measures of relatedness either.i However, what is
important to note at this stage is that the answer to the second question does not follow by
implication from the first. We now turn to describing each paper and the relationship between
them in greater detail.
3 The conventional way ofmeasuring relatedness is to use distances in the SIC-system as a proxy for relatedness.
However the literature contains a plethora of other measures, including technology flows, input ratios, human
resource profiles, commodity flows, ete. We refer to paper number two for an overview of the various
measurement procedures.
4 An affirmative answer to this question may also suggest that the SP can be used to overcome other
measurement problems in other areas of inquiry.
5 However one may experience a loss of excitement with respect to the answer to the first question, since if the
answer was no, there would be no sense in asking the second.
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2. The Papers
The four papers that represent the body of this dissertation can be seen as constituting a 1+3
structure. This 1+3 structure refers to the two research questions discussed in the preceding
paragraph, where one paper addresses the first question. and subsequently three papers than in
combination seeks build an answer to the second question. Having said this. each of the three
papers that addresses the second question are indeed independent works, but they are
cumulative in the sense that each adds evidence to the overall conclusion.
2.1 Can the Survivor Principle Survive Diversification?
This paper addresses the question of whether data from corporate diversification support the
validity of empirical strategies that rely on the survivor principle. In other words, the SP itself
is put to the test. As noted previously, there is no existing study known to the author that
explicitly attempts to subject the SP to a falsification test. This is problematic because a large
number of empirical studies in the fields of economics, strategy and organizational economics
rely on the validity of the SP in the empirical strategies chosen. The attractiveness of the SP in
the context of theory testing is the idea that a sample of competitive firms can be assumed to
display what is efficient. This involves the significant advantage that efficiency (which is
always the ultimate dependent variable in studies relying on the SP) does not have to be
measured. It can be assumed to be a property that dominates within a sample of competitive
firms. Hence. the measurement task can be reduced to matching predictions of what
constitutes efficient behavior to actual behavior.
So how can we test whether the empirical strategy of not measuring the dependent variable is
valid? We start by assuming that which industries a diversified firm combines within its
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corporate portfolio has efficiency consequences for the firm. Secondly, we tentatively assume
that the SP works, which in the context of corporate diversification implies that those
industries that are most frequently combined inside firms should on average represent more
efficient combinations than those that are rarely combined. 1fthis second assumption does not
hold, the SP is not valid for corporate diversification. and if the SP were not valid here it
would raise serious questions about whether it holds for any of the other areas where it is
commonly used. This second assumption is what we design our test to examine.
To conduct such a test two steps are required. The first is to obtain a measure of the degree to
which the behavior of competitive firms seems to indicate that a pair of industries are related
(i.e. efficient to combine). Towards this end we estimate how much the frequencies of actual
combinations of 4-digit SIC-industries deviate from what one would expect if diversification
patterns were random (Teece et al., 1994). We take this difference to constitute a survivor-
based measure of the relatedness between a given pair of industries. A large, positive
difference indicates that they are closely related; zero or a negative difference indicates that
they are unrelated. From this we can calculate measures of how related a given business i is to
the other businesses in the portfolio of the parent. We calculate two such measures. One
captures how related a given business i is to all the other businesses of the parent. another
how related a given business i is to the two closest related businesses of the parent.
The second step is to examine whether the combinations that have been designated as
efficient by this survivor-based procedure actually perform better than those designated as
being less efficient. For this purpose we examine the probability that a given parent will exit
one of its businesses. The prediction is that the probability of a business i being exited is
lower the higher the score on both measures of survivor-based relatedness. A confirmation of
this prediction would suggest that the behavior of firms in competitive markets does contain
information about what is efficient or more specifically: the efficiency of combining different
15
industries inside firms. Hence. the conclusion would be that the SP has survived this attempt
at falsification. Given that a disconfirmation would make the question raised in the three
following papers meaningless. we reveal no big secret when we say that our data strongly
support this prediction.
A Common Introduction to the Three Remaining Papers
The three following papers all address the second research question. namely whether the SP
can be used to obtain a better way of measuring relatedness. We will first make some
introductory remarks that are relevant for all three papers. before we in subsequent sections
give a brief introduction to each.
The question worth raising. given that the SP apparently works in the context of corporate
diversification (in the sense that the combinations chosen by firms do contain information
about the efficiency of various combinations). is whether the survivor-based approach is a
superior procedure to empirically capture relatedness. The obvious way to answer this
question is to examine whether it seems to outperform the conventional approach, which is to
use relatedness measures based on distances in the SIC-system (Caves et al., 1980: Jaquemin
and Berry, 1979).
Note that a survivor-based approach means that we let the actions of firms in competitive
markets inform us (researchers) about which industries are related to which. instead of
imposing some a priori view of what determines relatedness on the data. As such it represents
an abdication in terms of letting the SIC-system or the researcher be the better judge of what
is related to what. Instead a combination of the wisdom of local decision makers and the
screening function of the competitive process assumes responsibility for the quality of the
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measure. The procedure also means that we will not know what causes beneficia! relatedness
effects in each particular instance. and as such we will not be much wiser in terms of knowing
what relatedness is.6 But if proven superior to the conventional approach. we may improve
our ability to examine what relatedness does - with respect to its effects on various dependent
variables of interest (i.e. performance. growth, entry mode. financing. organizational choices.
etc.).
How does one test whether the survivor-based approach to relatedness is actually superior to
the SIC-based approach? One way of doing so is to identify some variable that relatedness
can be expected to affect. and measure the ability of the different measures to explain
variance in this variable. A poor measure should be able to explain less of the variance in such
a variable than a good measure. as is shown in figures l and 2 below. The large square
represents the total variance in the focal variable. A portion of this variation is explained by
the true effect of relatedness on this variable. which is represented by a square inside the
larger square. However. an imperfect measure of relatedness will only capture a portion of
this true effect. The higher the quality of the relatedness measure. the larger the captured
portion of the true effect. and the more of the total variance in the focal variable will be
explained. This is reflected by the increase of the shaded area as we move from a poor
measure (fig. l) to a better measure (fig. 2).
6 Although indirectly, the procedure may also be helpful for this purpose. One can for example let measures of
survivor-based relatedness be the dependent variable, and examine hypotheses about causes ofrelatedness (i.e.
variables that explain relatedness).
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Total variance
Poor measure of
relatedness of
relatedness
Better measure
of relatedness of
True effect
ofrelated-
ness
variance
True effect of
relatedness
Total variance
FIGURE l: Poor measure of relatedness FIGURE 2: Better measure ofrelatedness
However. there is reason to be cautious in using such a logic. The reason is that a superior
ability to explain variance can be spurious. that is. an effect of one or more exogenous
variables that the two measures correlate differently with. and that impact the variable whose
explained variance is being used for evaluation. This is depicted in Figure 3 below. Note that
if the different measures correlate equally with such exogenous variables. they will not affect
the relative performance of the measures. but the absolute level of explanation will of course
be affected. This means that it is important to control for such exogenous variables. in
particular those that can be expected to correlate differently with the different measures one is
companng.
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Total variance
True effect of
relatedness
variance Explained variance ascribed to
relatedness measure
FIGURE 3: Spuriously explained variance
With these remarks in mind. let us go back to the three papers. Two variables that relatedness
can be theoretically expected to affect are entry and exit decisions by diversified firms.
Accordingly, the ability to explain the probability of entry and exit represents an opportunity
to compare the performance of the survivor-based and SIC-based measures. This is what is
done in paper number 2 (exit) and paper number 3 (entry). We find that the survivor-based
measures explain more of the probability of both exit and entry than does the SIC-based
measures.
But as noted this finding could potentially be spurious, resulting from different correlations
with exogenous variables that affect entry and exit decisions. To reduce this likelihood a
number of control variables are included in both papers. However, even though these control
variables include the variables most frequently noted as predictors of entry and exit. the
spuriousness issue is not satisfactorily dealt with by the inclusion of these variables. In
particular there are two important candidates to create spuriousness that are not covered.
These two are of particular importance, because they can indeed be expected to influence the
relatedness measures we are comparing differently.
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We are referring to the tendency towards mimetic- or herd behavior, and the pursuit and
exploitation of mutual forbearance through multipoint competition. The survivor-based
measures, because of the way they are constructed, are more likely to capture such influences
than are SIC-based measures. Accordingly, the noted superior ability to explain exit and entry
may be an artifact thereof (i.e. not a superior ability to measure relatedness). We therefore
devote the fourth, and final paper to examine whether the supen or performance of the
survivor-based measures found in paper number 2 and 3 can be explained by these
phenomena. Our findings on this issue strongly indicate that they cannot.
We now move on to some brief remarks on each of the three papers.
2.4 Yet Another Way of Measuring Relatedness - This One: Let Competition Do It!
This paper compares survivor- and SIC-based measures of relatedness in terms of explaining
the probability of exit. As discussed in the previous section, the rationale is that a better
measure will explain the probability of exit better - but notably we need to be cautious about
the possibility that a superior ability to explain exit is spurious. We shall now briefly describe
how the paper makes a comparison of the two measures, and which safeguards are built into
the paper to reduce the risk of spuriousness affecting the conclusions.
We started by registering which industries a diversified finn participated 111, 111 1981. Our
focus is on firms that had exited some industries and remained in others by the year 1985.
Firms that were liquidated or sold in their entirety between 1981 and 1985 were excluded,
since such actions do not reveal information about the merits of combining different
industries inside firms, while exiting some businesses and keeping others do. From among
such firms a sample of 1191 businesses were chosen, of which 593 were exits and 598 were
non-exits. A logistic regression analysis was then conducted to evaluate which of the
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relatedness measures could best explain the probability that a given parent exited a given
industry. The analysis found that all measures based on the survivor approach significantly
outperformed allmeasures based on the SIC-approach.
Spuriousness may potentially affect such an analysis in two ways. Both relatedness measures
may correlate (equally) with some exogenous variable. This will have the effect of distorting
the absolute level of explanation, but not the relative level of explanation. Secondly, and for
the present purpose even more damaging, an exogenous variable may correlate differently
with the different measures. This will both affect the absolute level of explanation and the
relative level of explanation. To reduce this threat to the validity of the conclusions we
included several control variables that represent the most frequently noted influences on exit
decisions. On the industry level these are: industry growth, industry concentration and
industry profitability. On the firm level they are: market share in the focal industry, parent
size (sales), parent leverage and parent liquidity. Controlling for these variables. the
conclusion remains that all measures based on the survivor approach significantly
outperformed allmeasures based on the SIC-approach.
2.5 Relatedness and Patterns of Diversification: A Survivor-Based Approach
Based on the assumption that relatedness is relevant for entry decisions.i this paper compares
survivor- and SIC -based measures of relatedness in terms of explaining the probability that a
given parent enters a given industry. In a similar manner to the previous paper. we developed
a sample of 1202 entries and 1176 non-entries made by diversified firms betweenf 1981 and
1985. Next we conducted a logistic regression analysis to evaluate which of the relatedness
7 I.e. we assume that ceteris paribus, a diversified firm is more likely to enter an industry that is related to its
existing businesses. There is in fact a number of studies supporting such an assumption (Farjoun 1994,
Montgomery and Hariharan 1991, Silverman, 1999)
8 Between means that we identify businesses a parent was not active in, in 1981, which it mayor may not have
entered by 1985.
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measures could best explain the probability that a given parent entered a given industry. This
analysis. like the one on exit data. found that all measures based on the survivor approach
significantly outperformed all measures based on the SIC-approach.
In order to reduce the threat to this conclusion from spuriousness. we controlled for a number
of industry and parent firm variables that may affect entry decisions. These include industry
growth. industry concentration. industry profitability, parent size (sales). and parent diversity
(the number of industries participated in 1981).
In sum. the findings in this paper add to the evidence from the previous paper by validating
the superiority of the survivor-based measures against yet another variable.
2.6 Survivor-based Measures of Relatedness: Two Alternative Interpretations
This paper examines two alternative interpretations of the findings in the two previous papers.
The motivation is essentially that there is a deficiency in the controls for spuriousness in these
papers. and that the relevant omissions are of particular importance since we are talking about
influences that could inflate the explanatory power of the survivor-based measures relative to
the SIC-based measures.
The first is associated with the impact ofherd behavior. which refers to a tendency among
decision makers to suppress their private information. and follow the herd. This could be
because a bad decision is not as damaging for a manager's reputation when others make the
same mistake (Scharfstein and Stein. 1990). Or it could be because managers believe that the
actions of others reflect some private information that others have (i.e. if everybody does it, it
must be clever). however such tendencies means that the actions of each decision maker
becomes less informative to the others (Banerjee. 1992).
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The crucial point here is that the survivor-based measures can be expected to capture such
tendencies better than the SIC-based measures. The reason is simply that the survivor-based
approach involves explicitly measuring which combinations firms in the same industries as
the focal finn have chosen in a period recently preceding the decision period. These are
presumably the firms the focal firm would be herding after. The SIC-based approach. on the
other hand. is based on standardized distances in the SIC-system. and it plainly does not
reflect what "others are doing" nearly as well. There are for example numerous examples of
industries that are close in the SIC-system. but are never combined inside firms. and the
reverse: that firms are distant in the SIC-system. but frequently combined.
To examine the possibility that herd behavior accounts for the superior performance of the
survivor-based measures we developed a sample of 229 entries made between 1981 and 1983.
and compared the ability of the two measurement approaches to predict the probability that an
entry decision was reversed by 1987. The underlying logic is here that while herd behavior
may influence entry decisions. once entry has occurred competitive forces and economic
reality sets in and begins it work of screening the good decisions from the bad. If SIC- and
survivor-based measures capture true relatedness equally well. we would expect no difference
between the two approaches in terms of predicting reversal of entry decisions. However. we
again found that the survivor-based measures significantly outperformed the SIC-based
measures. which is inconsistent with the suggestion that the previously noted superiority of
the survivor-based measures will disappear when contamination from herd behavior is taken
into account.
The second alternative interpretation is based on mutual forbearance through multipoint
competition (Edwards 1955). This hypothesis suggests that high levels of contact between
firms across markets will induce a balance of terror where competitors refrain from attacking
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each other, and thereby instigate a condition of less vigorous competition than would
otherwise have occurred (Karnani and Wernerfelt, 1985). Research has provided empirical
support for the claim that creation and exploitation of mutual forbearance affects the behavior
and patterns of diversification of diversified firms (Greve and Baum, 2001). The potential
influence ofthis motive on entry and exit decision is especially worrying because the
survivor-based approach is likely to capture such motives better than the SIC-based measures.
The reason is that the survivor-based measures of relatedness are constructed from what
essentially amounts to a count of frequencies of multimarket contact. The prediction is that
firms will be more likely to enter industries where these counts will be high, and that they are
less likely to exit those where they are high. The very same predictions would result from a
mutual forbearance argument. Conversely, SIC-based measures are likely to be less
contaminated by such motives, because they are not constructed on the basis of multimarket
contact.
To examine the possibility that mutual forbearance accounts for the superior performance of
the survivor-based measures found in the two previous papers, we split the samples used in
these papers into two equally sized subsamples: one containing the most highly concentrated
industries, and one containing the least concentrated industries. The mutual forbearance
motive is only plausible in industries where concentration exceeds some minimum level, and
we therefore expected the survivor-based measures to outperform the SIC-based measures in
the high concentration subsamples (where the mutual forbearance motive is plausible), but not
in the low concentration subsamples (where the mutual forbearance motive is not plausible).
Rerunning the original regressions on these subsamples, we found that the mutual forbearance
interpretation was strongly contradicted. In fact the superiority of the survivor-based measures
held for all subsarnples, and was indeed larger in the low concentration subsamples. In other
24
words. the superiority of the survivor-based measures does not seem to disappear when
contamination from herd behavior is taken into account.
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Abstract: The survivor principle holds that hypotheses about efficient firm behavior can be
tested by observing how firms actually behave in competitive markets. This principle
underlies much of the empirical work in organizational economics and strategic management.
The validity of the survivor principle itself, and subsequently the empirical work that relies
on it. boils down to an empirical question: To what extent do competitive markets actually
display what is efficient? Despite the centrality of this question for the accumulation of
knowledge, and despite the extensive theoretical discourse surrounding it, we have not seen
any attempts to settle this issue empirically. This paper contributes an empirical test of the
survivor principle within the area of corporate diversification. Our findings provide support
for the validity of relying on the survivor principle in empirical tests.
Comments from Nicolai J. Foss, Peter G. Klein and Olav Kvitastein are gratefully acknowledged. All errors and
obscurities remain the sole responsibility of the author.
1. Introduction
Much of the empirical work in organizational economics and strategic management assumes
that we can infer what strategies or finn characteristics are efficient by observing what firms
actually do. Do high levels of asset specificity require more hierarchical modes of
governance? Regress the decision to vertically integrate on a measure of asset specificity. In
what industries do the incentive effects of performance-based pay outweigh the losses from
inefficient risk sharing? Simply regress the use of performance-based pay on finn and
industry characteristics. In other words. to see what strategies or structures work well with
what attributes. or what combinations of business decisions work well together. we look at
actual behavior. assuming that markets are sufficiently competitive. Hypotheses about
efficient behavior can be tested by observing which behaviors dominate in populations of
competitive firms.
This assumption is otten referred to as the survivor principle. The name was coined by Stigler
(1968). but the ideas are usually credited to Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953 ).9 Alchian
argued that even though economic theories about rational decision makers making efficient
choices are clearly unrealistic. the predictions of such a theory are not. The quest for
economic profit. combined with selection forces in competitive markets. ensures that the
behavior of competitive firms will roughly approximate the substantive predictions of such a
theory (Alchian, 1950. p. 211). Or. as Friedman (1953. p. 22) puts it
[U]nless the behavior of businessmen in some way or other approximated
behavior consistent with the maximization of returns. it seems unlikely that
9 Some trace the concept back to Harrod (1938). Another early contributor is Enke (1951).
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they would remain in business for long. Let the apparent immediate
determinant of business behavior be anything at all-habitual reaction.
random choice. or whatnot. Whenever this determinant happens to lead to
behavior consistent with rational and informed maximization of returns. the
business will prosper and acquire resources with which to expand; whenever it
does not. the business will tend to lose resources and can be kept in existence
only by the addition of resources from outside. The process of "natural
selection" thus helps to validate the [maximization] hypothesis-or. rather.
given natural selection. acceptance of the hypothesis can be based largelyon
the judgment that it summarizes appropriately the conditions for survival.
Note that the general claim is that surviving firms will behave "efficiently." however that is
defined. not necessarily that this behavior is particularly well described by neoclassical
economics. Thus. while transaction cost economists may claim that the efficiency calculus of
neoclassical economics gives insufficient consideration to bounded rationality and
opportunism (Williamson. 1975. 1985). and resource-based theorists may claim that it
downplays factor market imperfections (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney. 1986; Diercickx and
Cool, 1989); they may still accept a general version of the survivor principle. Williamson
(1988, p. 174). for example. notes that empirical research in transaction cost economics
"relies in a general, background way on the efficacy of competition to perform a sort between
more and less efficient modes and to shift resources in favor of the former."
Judging from its adoption in empirical studies, the survivor principle seems widely accepted.
Indeed. as argued below. it can be described as the default empirical strategy in economics
and organizational economics. and it is also common in strategic management. and several
related fields. But how well does the economic natural selection process work? Are
inefficient outcomes eliminated quickly, or with long and variable lags? How important are
industry and economy-wide characteristics such as regulation. capital-market performance.
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anti-takeover amendments. and bankruptcy codes? Williamson acknowledges that the process
of transaction cost economizing. for instance. is not automatic. The efficient alignment of
transactions and governance structures
seems plausible. especially if the relevant outcomes are those that appear over
intervals of five and ten years rather than in the very near tenn. This intuition
would nevertheless benefit from a more fully developed theory of the selection
process. Transaction cost arguments are thus open to some of the same
objections that evolutionary economists have made of orthodoxy (Williamson.
1988. p. 174).
Given its widespread (and controversial) use. it is surprising that the survivor principle itself
has not been subject to empirical testing. This paper investigates the survivor principle in the
context of exit decisions by diversified firms. We begin by assuming that which industries are
combined within a firm has consequences for the efficiency of the firm. If the survivor
principle holds. we can further assume that those pairs of industries that are most frequently
combined within firms on average represent more efficient combinations than those pairs of
industries that are rarely combined. In other words. the behavior of competitive firms can
show us which combinations are efficient. If so. a diversified firm should be significantly
more likely to exit those industries that this "survivor logic" identifies as a poor match with
other businesses in the portfolio. compared to those identified as representing a good match.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the content and critique of the survivor
principle. Section 3 presents how the frequency of combinations of industries in diversified
firms can be converted to a survivor-based measure of relatedness. and from this we develop
hypotheses that test the survivor principle in the context of corporate diversification. Section
4 discusses our empirical approach. Section 5 presents our results. and section 6 concludes.
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2. The survivor principle
Alchian's (1950) initial formulation of the survivor principle was conducted in a period when
economic theory was under increasing attack for being based on unrealistic representations of
human decision making. The critics argued that since actual decision makers did not have the
information nor the processing capabilities assumed in economic models (Simon. 1947). and
generally did not make decisions by way of marginal analysis (Lester. 1946). the value of
conventional economic theory was questionable. Alchian made the point that even though
economic models may be unrealistic as process models of how decisions are made: the
outcomes predicted by economic theory were likely to be both robust and quite accurate. Two
key processes would ensure this. One was that firms making negative profits would. unless
some corrective measure was taken. lose resources and ultimately become extinct. while
firms making positive profits would acquire resources and grow. The other was that the
desire to make positive profits would provide a strong incentive for the less successful firms
to imitate the more successful firms. In combination, Alchian postulated that these two forces
implied that surviving firms in competitive markets would appear "as if' they were behaving
in the manner described by economic theory.
Friedman (1953) took Alchian's ideas one step further (or too far, as some would argue) in
two respects. The first is that while unrealistic behavioral assumptions to Alchian was
something that could be compensated for by the selection forces and profit incentives of the
competitive process, to Friedman unrealistic assumptions were a virtue rather than a vice. In a
famous methodological essay he argued the point that building theories on realistic
assumptions is not only infeasible, but also undesirable (Friedman. 1953). A good theory,
according to Friedman. is a theory that explains much by little. in the sense of generating
good predictive accuracy by selecting a few simplifying assumptions that removes the clutter
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and detail of the real world. In Friedman' s view the goal of building theories on realistic
assumptions would produce theories that were mere imperfect representations of reality. He
pronounced conventional economic analysis to be an example of a useful theory. not because
its assumptions are realistic. but because the forces described by Alchian would ensure great
predictive accuracy. Secondly. Friedman went further than Alchian with respect to the
accuracy ofthese predictions. He claimed that the competitive process would produce
outcomes consistent with optimizing behavior. while Alchian made the more modest claim
that the competitive process would systematically select the best among the tested
alternatives (survival of the fitter. rather than survival of the fittest).l0
The arguments of Alchian and Friedman have been put to two different uses. one theoretical
and one empirical. The theoretical use is a defense for explaining economic institutions and
economic behavior on the basis of efficiency consequences; even if such theories are far from
realistic accounts of the causal processes that create the phenomena of interest (Dow. 1987).
Such theories are referred to as functionalistic explanations. and they dominate within
economics and organizational economics. The other. and for our purposes more important
use. is related to theory testing. If the survivor principle holds. a sample of competitive firms
can by and large be assumed to display what is efficient. This involves the significant
advantage that efficiency does not have to be measured. It can be assumed to be a property
that dominates a sample of competitive firms. When testing theories that have efficiency as
the ultimate dependent variable. the measurement task can be reduced to matching
predictions of what constitutes efficient behavior to actual behavior.
This empirical strategy is widely adopted (though only rarely explicitly stated). We recognize
it from empirical tests of transaction cost analysis. where for example the hypothesis that
vertical integration is more efficient than market governance when asset specificity is high. is
10 Thus it is quite possible to agree with Alchian but disagree with Friedman, a point we elaborate below.
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tested by measuring whether firms actually integrate when assert specificity is high (see
Shelanski and Klein. 1995. and Boerner and Macher. 2001. for surveys of a vast empirical
literature). We also recognize it from agency theory where hypotheses about the relative
efficiency of alternative contracts are tested by measuring which contracts firms actually
employ (e.g .. Anderson. 1985; Eisenhardt. 1985). And we recognize it from studies of
diversification within the strategic management literature. where for example hypotheses
about what constitutes efficient patterns of diversification are tested by measuring their
consistency with actual patterns of diversification (e.g .. Farjon, 1994; Montgomery and
Hariharan. 1991; Silverman. 1999; Matsusaka, 200 l). These are just a few examples of
empirical papers that rely on the survivor principle. In addition it is widely used in industrial
organization and property rights theory. and occasionally within finance and marketing. A
comprehensive review extends far beyond what can be accomplished here. but it seems safe
to conclude that use of the survivor principle is a central empirical strategy in the study of
organizations and their behavior.
Given its widespread use one may be led to believe that the survivor principle is
uncontroversial. However. it is not. Right from the outset critics have questioned its use in
both theory development and theory testing (Penrose. 1952). Regarding theory development
critics have argued that the survivor principle encourages abandoning the goal of building
theories that provide true accounts of the relevant causal processes. and that it is therefore
detrimental to scientific progress. In particular there has been a long and heated debate over
Friedman's (1953) position on the (ir)relevance of building theories on realistic assumptions
(see. for example. Blaug, 1980; Boland. 1979; Caldwell, 1980; Musgrave. 1981; Måki, 1994).
For our purposes the critique of the survivor principle as an assumption in theory testing is
more important.
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Is the selection processes in competitive markets sufficiently fast and precise to justify the
assumption that surviving firms are "efficient" or at least approximately so? The answer
depends on whether we focus on Friedman's "optimizing" version of the survivor principle or
Alchian s "comparative efficiency" version. One important argument against the optimizing
version relates to the problem of sufficient variation. Since selection only operates on the
tested behavior or decisions. there must be sufficient variation so that the optimal behavior is
part of the set selection operates on. If not. selection cannot produce an optimaloutcome
(Nelson and Winter. 1982). The idea that variation is sufficient for the optimal behavior to
always be a part of the set oftested solutions appears to be quite a bold assertion. On the
other hand one may claim that even if the optimal solution is not part of the initial set.
entrepreneurship, incremental learning and experimentation will soon make it so. However.
for selection to produce optimaloutcomes in this manner. the benefits from changing towards
the optimum must be continually increasing. If there is a local optimum next to a global
optimum. it may be impossible to reach the global optimum from the local optimum; there
could be a portion between the two points where the benefit curve is downward sloping. and
hence the optimum point cannot be reached through evolution by small steps (Elster. 1989).
Even ifthere is no such negatively sloped portion of the benefit curve. the need for a slow
evolution towards the optimum would mean that the system is outside the optimum for
substantial periods of time. which would of course seriously damage the descriptive accuracy
of the optimizing version of the survivor principle. Thus. the idea that competition is an
optimizer seems hard to accept as an accurate description of empirical reality.
Alchian's comparative efficiency version of the survivor principle. which is the version
relied upon in most empirical work, is not vulnerable to this critique.v' His argument is that
11 Alchian's version is the one implicitly used inmost empirical work because hypotheses are typically
formulated as comparative statements about efficiency, for example between hierarchical and market
governance, related and unrelated diversification, fixed or variable compensation, and the like. Empirical tests
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selection will operate on the tested solutions only. and bring about a situation where the
comparatively best of these dominate. He explicitly points out that this does not imply
optimal solutions: "Positive profits accrue to those who are better than their competitors. even
if the participants are ignorant. intelligent. skillful. etc .... As in a race. the award goes to the
relatively fastest. even if all competitors loaf" (Alchian. 1950. p. 213). However. this more
modest version of the survivor principle is not immune to some of the other critical
arguments against the survivor principle. For example Winter (1964. 1971) has pointed out
that because of environmental change. selection has a moving target. If environmental
conditions change at a higher rate than selection and adaptation processes operate. it becomes
difficult to say which environmental conditions a population is adapted to. In other words. the
populations we observe today may be dominated by the solutions that were efficient in the
environment of yesterday. To what extent this invalidates the survivor principle seems
ultimately to be an empirical issue concerning the relative speed of environmental change vs.
selection and adaptation. which cannot be decided a priori.
Another important (and related) objection concerns the multitude of decisions that affect
performance. While the former point dealt with the stability over time of the conditions that
determine what constitutes an efficient choice, the current point has to do with the numerous
conditions that at anyone time will affect performance. Given that selection operates on
actual performance, and not the causes of performance (Elster, 1989). a surviving firm may
contain a mixture of efficient and inefficient choices. Particularly if selection forces are weak.
a firm may survive even if some of the decisions made are inefficient. as long as other
decisions cause sufficient efficiency to ensure survival. Thus. a survivor-based measure of
what constitutes an efficient choice will be noisy and probably noisier the less important the
decision studied. By importance we here refer to the efficiency consequences of not choosing
of such comparative statements do not rely on the optimizing version of the survivor principle, but only that
relatively more efficient outcomes will tend to be observed.
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the best alternative. But again. the weight of this argument seems to be a matter that can only
be settled empirically.
Furthermore. it has been pointed out that there is a feedback mechanism between market
selection and environmental conditions (Hodgson. 1993). For example. if one finn makes a
decision to enter a new market. and is successful. competitors may follow suit. As more firms
enter the new market. profitability is pushed downward. and it is possible that what was
efficient for the first mover becomes inefficient for the later movers - or even for the first
mover as well. This scenario could apply to new technologies, new organizational designs. or
new distribution forms as well. The challenge this presents to the survivor principle is that it
is precisely widespread adoption in a population that converts what was once efficient to
inefficiency. If such scenarios occur often. it is damaging to the idea that a population is
dominated by the comparatively efficient solutions. Whether they do occur often is yet
another matter that can only be settled empirically.
In sum. there are some important objections to using the comparative efficiency version of
the survivor principle as an assumption in empirical tests. However. the fact that empirical
strategies that employ the survivor principle are noisy is not a sufficient reason to discard it a
priori. The question that must be asked is whether it is noisier than alternative available
strategies. If we instead attempt to measure efficiency directly we will also obtain less than
perfect measures. The question thus becomes one of the relative noise of different empirical
strategies. Ifthere are situations where survivor-based approaches are less noisy than
available alternatives, then such strategies should continue to playa role in empirical
research. But to settle this question requires that the survivor principle itselfbe scrutinized
empirically. A logical first step in doing so seems to be to examine empirically the
assumption that decisions or behaviors that occur frequently in a population of competitive
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firms are on average more efficient than those that occur rarely. We now proceed with such a
test within the area of corporate diversification.
3. A survivor-based measure of relatedness
As noted in the introduction a fundamental assumption in the present study is that which
industries are combined within a firm has efficiency consequences for the finn. We shall
refer to these efficiency consequences as the relatedness of a given industry to other
industries in the portfolio of a given finnY However. we will not make any attempt to
specify exactly what causes such efficiency consequences. but instead we assume-in
concordance with the survivor principle-that the decisions made by competitive firms can
reveal the relatedness between any given pair of industries. The fundamental premise of this
survivor-based approach to relatedness is thus that industries that are related will be more
frequently combined in one finn. More specifically. we estimate how much the frequencies
of actual combinations of 4-digit SIC industries deviate from what one would expect if
diversification pattems were random, We take this difference to constitute a survivor-based
measure of the relatedness between a pair of industries. This method was originally proposed
and developed by Teece. Rumelt. Dosi. and Winter (1994).
Let the universe of diversified firms consist of K firms. each active in two or more of I
industries. Let ('ik = l if firm k is active in industry i. The number of industries participated in
by firm k is 111k= LiCik and the number of diversified firms present in industry i is ni = LkCik.
Let.fi} be the number of diversified firms active in both industries i andj, such that
12 Relatedness has primarily been studied at the inter-industry level, but since firms in any industry differ in their
resources there may be a relatedness component that is firm specific (see, for example, Silverman, 1999). In line
with most of the existing work, the focus is here on inter-industry relatedness.
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.li} = Lk ('itC fk. Thus.Z, is a count of how often industries i andj are actually combined within
the same firm . .Ii} will be larger if industries i andj are related. but will also increase with l1i
and 1'l. To remove the effect of the size of industries i andj. the number.Z, is compared with
the number of expected combinations if diversification patterns were random.
The random diversification hypothesis can be operationalized as a hypergeometric situation
where a sample of size n, is drawn (without replacement) from a population of K firms. Those
chosen are considered to be active in industry i. A second independent sample of size l1i is
then drawn from the population the population of K firms. Those chosen are considered
active in industry). The number xi} of firms active in both i andj is then a hypergeometric
random variable with population K. specialmembers n, and sample size l1i. The distribution
function for this variable is then:
The mean and variance of Xi} are:
A standardized measure of the relatedness between industries i andj is then constructed based
on the difference between.Z, and,£lii in the following fashion:
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The measure SRij is thus a standardized measure of how much actual combinations exceed
expected combinations under the random diversification hypothesis. With this fundamental
measure in hand it is possible to establish a survivor-based measure of how related a given
business in a corporate portfolio is to the other businesses in the same portfolio. Again the
procedure is based on Teece et al. (1994).
Assume a diversified firm that participates in 111 industries. Its business in industry ihas sales
of .'I; and survivor-based relatedness SRij with industryj. The weighted average relatedness
WAR; of the business in industry i to all other business in the tinn is then defined as:
" S'R ..s,l1lAR. = .L.Jj~i y J
I L S.
j~i J
An alternative approach does not consider how related each business is to al/ other business
in the corporate portfolio, but how related each business is to its 111'0 closest neighboring
businesses. The approach here is to rank the survivor-based measure SRij between a given
industry, and all other industries in the parent portfolio. The two industries with the highest
measure of SRij are considered the neighboring businesses. Let Ay = l for a business that is
defined as a neighbor to business i, and Ay = Ofor those that are not. The weighted average
relatedness of neighbors to business i is then defined by:
" SR ..s .A ..WARN. = .L.Jj~i y J Y
I "s.A ..
.L.Jj~i J Y
Note that the measures WAR; and WARN; are indeed survivor-based measures of relatedness,
since they are created under the explicit assumption that the diversification decisions made by
competitive firms reveal information about the efficiency of different combinations. Yet
actual diversified firms will to varying degrees contain combinations that have been
designated as efficient by this procedure. The survivor principle implies that businesses
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scoring low on these measures are more likely to be exited than businesses scoring high. Such
businesses are likely to be associated with lower performance than those that tit well because
they benefit less from economies of scope with the other businesses, and because they add
complexity and governance costs to the finn (Prahalad and Bettis. 1986). Furthermore. there
is a comparatively higher probability that owners with better combinations will bid more for
such a business than the current owners expect it to generate (Goold. Campell, and
Alexander. 1994). For these reasons we expect them to be associated with high probability of
exit whether by closure or divesture. More specifically we get the following hypotheses:
Hl: Businesses with low levels of survivor-based relatedness (WAR;) to oil o/her
businesses in the corporate portfolio are more likely to be exited than businesses with
high levels of survivor-based relatedness.
H2: Businesses with low levels of survivor-based relatedness (WARN;) to the closest
neighboring businesses in the corporate portfolio are more likely to be exited than
businesses with high levels of survivor-based relatedness.
If these hypotheses should fail to receive support this would presumably be either because
the combination of industries in firms does not have efficiency consequences, or because the
decisions of firms in competitive markets are unable to reveal which combinations are
efficient. Since we hold the former to be unlikely.v' we submit that this constitutes an
empirical test of the latter - that is, a test of the survivor principle.
13 The findings regarding the performance of corporate portfolios are admittedly mixed (Hoskisson and Hitt,
1990; Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989; Robins and Wiersma, 1995). However, by most accounts this is not
because corporate diversification is irrelevant, but because relatedness is difficult to measure. Like Teece, Dosi,
Rumelt, and Winter (1994), we do not impose a particular view of relatedness on the data. Instead we let the
data tell us what appears to be related to what.
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4. Empirical approach
This study involves two distinct empirical operations. The first operation is to develop the
fundamental survivor-based measures of relatedness SRij for any pair of industries that are
combined in a diversified finn. in order to be able to calculate the key independent variables
WAR; and WARN;. The second empirical operation is to test HI and H2. Since the data.
samples. variables and method of analysis vary between these two empirical operations. we
discuss methodological issues separately for each.
-I.l. Calculating relatedness
To calculate the survivor-based measure of relatedness SRij we used the AGSM/Trinet Large
Establishment Database (Trinet). The Trinet database contains biannual records of all U.S.
establishments14 with more than 20 employees from 1979 to 198915• including data on 4-digit
SIC code. corporate ownership. and sales. By aggregating the establishments for each parent
in each 4-digit sic-code. and the different 4-digit sic-codes for each parent. and different
parents for each 4-digit SIC industry. we are able to get a comprehensive picture of
diversification patterns in the U.S. economy. Comparison with the Census of Manufacturers
indicates that Trinet contains 95 percent of all establishments it should (Voight. 1993). and
that omissions are most likely for small firms (which are less likely to be diversified). The
primary measure of SRij was calculated from the Trinet files of 1981. using all recorded firms
active in two or more 4-digit SIC-codes as a basis. After deleting single business firms.
government owned and non-profit industries. this resulted in a total of 13.164 diversified
firms. active in 929 different industries. covering 57.647 individual businesses. Of the
14 Trinet also includes foreign establishments in the U.S.
15 Because of changes in the parent coding in the Trinet database in 1979, and changes in the SIC classification
scheme in 1987, only data from the years 1981, 1983 and 1985 are directly comparable.
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431.056 possible industry pairs. 122.105 were observed. The measure of SRi} between the
observed industry pairs ranged from -7.97 to 93.55 with a mean of4.33 and a standard
deviation of 5.06. Based on these calculations of SRi} we calculated WAR; and WARN;
following the procedures described in section 3. Finally. note that relatedness between
industries as measured by SRi} changes very little over the period covered in this study. The
correlation between SRi} in 1981 and 1983 is 0.941. and between 1981 and 1985 is 0.895.
-1.2. Sample
HI stated that if the survivor principle holds. businesses with low levels of survivor-based
relatedness to al! o/her businesses in a corporate portfolio (WAR;) are more likely to be exited
than businesses with high levels of survivor-based relatedness. H2 stated that businesses with
low levels of survivor-based relatedness (WARN;) to the closest neighboring businesses in the
corporate portfolio are more likely to be exited than businesses with high levels of survivor-
based relatedness. To construct our sample for examining these hypotheses. we began with
all 13.164 diversified firms in the Trinet database. To obtain the necessary data for the
variables of interest. Trinet data had to be merged with financial data from Compustat
database. Since the parent identity numbers in these two databases are different. the matching
had to be done alphanumerically by parent name. Spelling differences between the two
databases resulted in undisputable matches for 854 companies that had entries in all the years
needed to compute the variables. We believe this matching procedure to be a functional
equivalent of random sampling. since there is no reason to expect spelling matches of parent
names in the two databases to be biased in any particular way.16
16 The matching of Trinet and Compustat data creates a bias toward larger firms compared to Trinet data alone.
The reason for this is that Compustat contains publicly traded firms only, while Trinet contains both. Publicly
traded firms are on average larger than privately held firms.
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We imposed two further restrictions on our sample. One "vas to remove firms that were sold
or liquidated in their entirety between 1981 and 1985. The reason being that such actions do
not reveal information about the merits of combining different industries inside one firm.
while exiting some businesses and keeping others do. Finally. we restricted our sample to
firms that had more than 20 million dollars in sales in 1981. This resulted in a net sample of
70 firms. These 70 firms operated 2.640 businesses in 466 different 4-digit SIC codes in
1981. They exited a total of 593 industries betweenl7 1981 and 1985. while they remained in
2.024 industries throughout the period and entered 738 new industries.
To test our hypotheses we included all the 593 instances of exit. but rather than using the
entire sample of non-exits. we used a random-sample generator to select a sample of non-
exits of comparable size. State based sampling has been suggested as preferable to a pure
random sample when a population is overwhelmingly characterized by one state. and will
provide unbiased and consistent coefficients for all variables except the constant term
(McFadden and Manski. 1981). Thus the final sample consisted of a total of 1.191
observations. 593 of which were exits. and 598 non-exits.
To test HI and H2 we developed a model of the relationship between the probability of exit
and survivor-based relatedness. which controls for a number of industry- and parent variables
that previous research indicates may affect the exit decision. Given the dichotomous nature of
the dependent variable. a logistic regression analysis was considered appropriate for testing
this model. The general model is the following:
P(exit =1) = /3J + Pl (industry growth) + /13 (industry concentration) + P4
(industry profitability) + P5 (parent size) + P6 (parent market share) +p,
(parent leverage) +P8 (parent liquidity) + Ø9 (parent relatedness) + e .
17 Note that the relatedness measures are based on data from the 1981 files, while exits are identified using the
1983 and 1985 files (i.e., exits after 1981).
43
The dependent variable is coded as follows. If a parent active in a 4-digit SIC code in
1981 has exited this business by 1985. the dependent variable is given a value of l. If
the parent is still active in the industry. the value assigned is O. Both divestures and
closures are thus considered to represent exit. The Trinet database was used to
identify exits and non-exits.
-1.3.Industry-level independent variables
In testing HI and H2 it is important to control for influences on the exit decision that are
attributable to the profitability of the industry in question. All things equal firms are
presumably less likely to exit an industry with high average profitability than one with low
profitability. The negative relationship between relatedness and the probability of exit should
exist independent of such industry effects. This study controls for three industry level
variables that both theory and empirical research have found to affect the attractiveness of an
industry. These variables are: industry growth. industry concentration. and industry
profitability. Note that the latter variable. industry profitability, is included to control for
unspecified industry effects not captured by the two other industry level control variables.
Industry growth. Industry growth is widely assumed to affect industry attractiveness
favorably. because it allows firms to grow without having to steal customers from
competitors. Thus. industry growth tends to soften competitive rivalry and raise the average
profitability. Such a relationship has been confirmed in numerous empirical studies (i.e.
Kwoka and Ravenscraft. 1986; Salinger. 1984; Schmalensee, 1989). One would accordingly
expect a negative relationship between the growth of an industry. and the probability of exit.
This variable is derived byestimating the growth in percent of industry sales between 1981
and 1985. as reported in Trinet.
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Industry concentration. Traditional industrial organization theory posits a positive
relationship between industry concentration and industry profitability (Bain, 1956; Porter.
1980). Scale economies and other sources of market power. it is argued. reduce the threat
from potential entrants. allowing incumbents more room to raise prices without inviting
entry. Such a relationship has found support in empirical studies (Bain. 1951: Montgomery.
1985: Weiss. 1974). but the relationship between concentration and industry profitability
remains controversial since a number of studies have failed to find such a relationship. and
for those that do. the direction of causality is uncertain (see Schmalensee. 1989. for a review).
We expect a negative relationship between the industry concentration and the probability of
an industry being exited. The variable is derived byestimating the 4-firm concentration ratio
of each industry for 1981. based on the Trinet data.
Industry profitability. Industry profitability may be affected by numerous other factors
beyond growth and concentration. To control for such unspecified factors we calculated a
measure of the median return on assets for each industry over the 1980-82 period. The
procedure used here calls for some elaboration. The Compustat database which was used to
derive industry profitability consists of a segment database that report return on assets (ROA)
by 4-digit segment SIC code. and a corporate database that reports report ROA on the firm
level. We used all observations in the segment database and all single business firms in the
corporate database to calculate industry profitability. However this creates a problem because
the ROA measures are not directly comparable over these two databases. Because of
incomplete asset allocation. ROA is systematically higher in the segment database. To
preserve observations we calculated the mean of all observations in each database for each
year. and we subsequently divided each individual observation by this mean. Thus. the
individual observations were standardized as deviations in percent from the database mean
for the relevant year. This allowed us to use observations from both databases and all three
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years. and we subsequently calculated the median ofthis measure for each industry. Where a
minimum of tive observations were obtained. this was done on the level of 4-digit SIC-
industries. if less than five observations were obtained the same measure was calculated on
the 3-digit level. if still less than five observations where obtained. the measure was
calculated on the 2-digit level (following Berger and Ofek, 1995). We expect a negative
relationship between industry profitability and the probability of exit.
-I. -I. Firm-level independent variables
Besides industry level factors. testing HI and H2 also requires control for effects that are
attributable to other properties of the tinn than that of the relatedness of the business in
question. We control for four firmlevel properties that both theory and empirical research
have found to affect exit decisions. These variables are market share. parent size. parent
leverage and parent liquidity.
Market shore. A positive relationship between market share and profitability is documented
in a large number of empirical studies (e.g .. Gale. 1971; Sheperd. 1972; Robins and Wiersma.
1995). There are numerous explanations for this relationship, ranging from market power
explanations through cost advantages due to learning curve effects and economies of scale.
Given these positive performance effects we expect firms to be less likely to exit a business
where they hold large market shares. The variable is measured as firm sales in industry i as
percent of industry sales in 1981. and is expected to be signed negatively. The data are based
on the Trinet tiles.
Parent size. The size of the parent has as noted been used as an indicator of market power
and economies of scale. In addition parent size is an indicator of a parent's level of financial-
and other resources. Based on this we expect a negative relationship between parent size and
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the probability of exit. The variable is measured as the total sales of the parent in 1981. based
on Trinet data.
Parent leverage. A highly leveraged parent may be under pressure from banks and investors
to sustain a high cash flow in the short term to avoid an excessive bankruptcy risk. This is
likely to reduce the patience with low performing businesses in the portfolio. Furthermore. a
highly leveraged firm may experience constraints in funding attractive investment
opportunities. Divesture of one business may therefore be an attractive way to finance
investments in another. Therefore we expect the leverage of the parent to be positively related
to the probability of a business being exited. The variable PARLEY is measured as long tenn
debt to market value in 1981. The data were obtained from the Compustat database.
Parent liquidity. A low current ratio. like a high leverage ratio. may indicate financial
constraints that makes exit more likely in order to reduce bankruptcy risk. or undertake
divesture as a method offinancing investments in other businesses. We therefore expect the
current ratio to be negatively related to the probability of a business being exited. The
variable is measured as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities in 1981. Data were
obtained from the Compustat database.
-I. -I. Relatedness variables
The survivor-based relatedness measures employed in the test of H l and H2 have been
presented above. The measure used in testing HI is called WAR; and captures the sales
weighted average relatedness of the business i to al! other businesses in the parent k. The
measure used in testing H2 is called WARN;, and it captures the sales weighted average
relatedness of business i to the two closest neighboring businesses in the parent k. Given that
the survivor principle holds. we expect WAR; and WARN;to be signed negatively.
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Variable definitions. data sources. and predicted signs are summarized in Table l below.
while Table 2 shows the means. standard deviations. and correlation coefficients for all
independent variables.
[Tables 1 and 2 about here]
5. Results and discussion
The results from the logistic regression analyses are presented in table 3. Table 3 contains
three different logistic regression models. Modell contains control variables only. Model 2
contains control variables plus the survivor-based measure of relatedness WAR. which is the
sales weighted average relatedness of the industry i. to all other industries in the parent
portfolio. Model 3 contains control variables plus the survivor-based measure of relatedness
WARN. which is the sales weighted average relatedness of the industry i to the two closest
neighboring industries in the parent portfolio.
[Table 3 about here]
HI predicted that WAR would have a significant and negatively signed effect on the
probability of exit. As can be seen from model 2 in table 3. this hypothesis is strongly
supported. The coefficient of the variable WAR is indeed negative and highly significant. We
furthermore note that all measures of model performance improve substantially in
comparison with model l. The model chi-square increases fr0111119.6 to 185.96 which is
significant at the 0.001 level. The two pseudo-P' measures (Cox & Snell R2 and Nagelkerke
K) both increase more than 50 percent. and the ability to correctly predict exits also increases
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approximately 50 percent. Table 4 shows how much explanatory power each variable adds to
model 2. and we observe that WAR adds more than any other variable. including such
"classics" as industry growth. industry concentration. industry profitability and market share.
[Table 4 about here]
H2 predicted that WARN would have a significant and negatively signed effect on the
probability of exit. This hypothesis is also strongly supported. The coefficient is negative and
highly significant. Again. allmeasures of model performance improve substantially in
comparison with model l. The model chi-square increases from 119.6 to 170.24 which is
significant at the 0.001 level. The two pseudo-x'' measures. Cox & Snell If and Nagelkerke
K. increase with 39 and 40 percent respectively. And the ability to correctly predict exits also
increases by 50 percent. Table 5 shows how much explanatory power each variable adds to
model 3. and again we observe that the survivor-based measure (in this case WARN) adds
more than any other variable.
[Table 5 about here]
However. we also note that the coefficient of WARN is both slightly smaller and that the rate
of improvement in the model performance over model l is slightly less for model 3 than for
model 2. In our opinion this indicates that there are positive effects of relatedness that extends
beyond the two closest related industries in a portfolio. and that the noted differences
between model 2 and 3 reflect this. More specifically. WARN performs slightly below WAR
because WARN restricts relatedness effects to the two closest related industries in each
portfolio.
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While H l and H2 did receive strong support. some of the control variables did not behave as
expected. This was particularly the case for industry concentration. which was expected to be
negatively related to the probability of exit. but instead a significant positive relationship was
found. Although surprising. this finding does have precedents (Schmalensee. 1989). One
reason may be that concentrated industries are difficult to enter. and that some of the exits in
our sample are in fact unsuccessful entry attempts. More generally. market concentration may
be a poor measure of competition (Hayek. 1948). The conditions that cause concentration
may also cause intense rivalry. For example the presence of substantial fixed costs will
typically cause concentration. but it also tends to make battles for market share more intense.
Thus episodes of intense competition may break out which hurt all incumbents. but smaller
firms in particular. As a result these smaller firms may exit by closing down. divesture to a
larger firm. or merger with other small firms to gain economies of scale. To test this we split
the sample in two based on market share. which resulted in a significant positive relationship
between concentration and probability of exit for the subsample with the smallest market
shares. and no relationship for the subsample with the largest market shares.
Another surprising finding was the insignificant relationship between industry profitability
and the probability of exit. There may be several factors contributing to this finding. One
reason may be associated with what Goold et al. (1994) call the parenting advantage criterion.
This criterion states that a business should be sold when the current owners are not the best
possible owners. because the better owners will be willing to pay more than the current ones
can expect from continued ownership. Abiding by this criterion would weaken the tendency
to retain a business because it is profitable or in a profitable industry. Secondly. the
distribution of profitability in high return industries may be highly skewed, such that even if
the profitability of the median firm is high. it covers a tale of low profitability firms.
Unfortunately the Compustat data used to construct the industry profitability measures in this
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study are too coarse to explore this possibility further. Thirdly. our results may simply be an
artifact of limitations in the underlying data used to compute industry profitability.
Finally. we may note that parent size. parent leverage and parent liquidity did not reach
significance either. This is somewhat less surprising since the number of parents included in
the final sample was 70. Thus we may lack sufficient statistical power to capture effects of
the sizes associated with these variables.
6. Conclusions
In sum. both H l and H2 received strong support. Apparently. in the context of diversification
what firms combine frequently does on average represent more efficient combinations than
those that occur rarely. In other words. what competitive firms do - does contain information
about what is efficient. Thus it would seem that the comparative efficiency version of the
survivor principle has withstood this first attempt at falsification. and more specifically. that
relying on the survivor principle is defensible when testing hypotheses about the efficiency
consequences of portfolio decisions.
However. these conclusions should be drawn with some caution. First of all there could be
other explanations for the observed patterns in the data. Some would argue that the early
1980s was a period where refocusing and de-conglomeration was increasingly fashionable,
and that the exits decisions observed here may be more influenced by fashion and herd
behavior than efficiency.Y To control for this possibility. future work should examine other
time periods and use other efficiency measures than exit. Secondly, although the findings
18 Note that WAR and WARN are both positively (and statistically significantly) correlated with market share,
consistent with an efficiency explanation.
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reported here does give support to the use of the survivor principle in research on
diversification, this does not mean that it holds for other decisions, such as for example the
choice between market- and hierarchical governance. To put the survivor principle on a firm
empirical footing requires that the validity of the survivor principle is tested empirically in all
areas where it is frequently used as an assumption. Obviously a substantial amount ofwork
remains before this is accomplished, but as far as this study is concerned, we conclude that
the survivor principle did survive diversification.
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Table 3: Results
Model Signs
(1) (2) (3) Expected Observed
Constant 0.44 1.02*** 1.33***
(1.60) (7.69) (12.25)
Industry growth --0.69*** --0.68*** --0.59***
(30.61) (28.09) (21.66)
Industry concentration 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* +
(3.18) (3.13) (3.45)
Industry profitability --0.06 --0.02 --0.07
(0.15) (0.01) (0.17)
Marketshare --0.15*** --0.12*** --0.12***
(37.39) (25.51) (28.82)
Parent size 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.50) (1.12) (0.56)
Parent leverage --0.61 --0.33 --0.45 +
(0.78) (0.21) (0.41)
Parent liquidity 0.01 0.04 --0.03
(0.00) (0.09) (0.52)
WAR --0.09***
(53.63)
WARN --0.04***
(46.80)
Log likelihood 1,531.46 1,465.10 1,480.82
Model i' 119.59*** 185.96*** 170.24***
Il. i' vs. model 1 66.37*** 50.65***
Cox and Snell If 0.096 0.145 0.133
Nagelkerke If 0.127 0.193 0.178
Percent correct
predictions 60.5 65.4 65.7
Logistic regressions of the probability of exit on relatedness (WAR and WARN) and industry and parent
characteristics. Wald statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1,5, and 10
percent levels, respectively. N=I,191.
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Table 4: Model iftenn removed (model 2)
Variable Change in-2 Signifcance
Log Likelihood ofchange
Industry growth 30.89 0.00
Industry concentrat ion 3.15 0.08
Industry profitahility 0.01 0.93
Market share 38.91 0.00
Parent size 1.12 0.29
Poren! leverage 0,21 0.65
Poren! liquidity 0.09 0.77
WAR 66.37 0.00
Table 5: Model ifterm removed (model 3)
Variable Change in-2 Signifcance
Log Likelihood ofchange
Industrv growth 23.96 0.00
Industry concentration 3.48 0.06
Industry profitability 0.17 0.68
Market share 45.79 0.00
Parent size 0.56 0.45
Parent leverage 0.41 0.52
Parent liquidity 0.05 0.82
WARN 50.65 0.00
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Abstract
Over the last two decades numerous procedures for measuring relatedness have been
suggested, primarily driven by the inability of our empirical research to demonstrate
consistent support for the hypothesized relationship between relatedness and corporate
performance. The main problem by most accounts is associated with measuring relatedness in
a manner consistent with theoretical developments, which includes some conditions that are
very difficult to operationalize. This paper suggests a fundamentally different approach to
these challenges. We submit a test of a survivor-based approach to measuring relatedness -
where a combination of the selection processes in competitive markets and the wisdom of
local decision makers are substituted for the insight of the researcher or the SIC-system in
capturing relatedness.
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1. Introduction
Despite the fact that no single issue has been given more attention in research on corporate
level strategy than the possible link between relatedness and performance, the empirical
results are usually summarized as mixed or confusing (Hoskisson and Hitt 1990: Markides
and Williamson, 1994, 1996: Reed and Luffman, 1986: Robins and Wiersema, 1995). Most
reviewers seem to ascribe this dim state of affairs to problems associated with measuring
relatedness in a manner consistent with the theoretical developments, which includes some
conditions that are very difficult to operationalize. Given these problems we suggest a
fundamentally different approach, one where a combination of the competitive process and
the knowledge oflocal decision makers replace the wisdom of the researcher (or the SIC-
system) in capturing relatedness. Basically this amounts to an assumption that what is related
is what firms in competitive markets combine often. More specifically it implies that a
measure of the relatedness between a pair of industries can be obtained by considering how
often a pair of industries are actually combined inside a firm - compared to what one would
expect if diversification patterns were random. Industries are related when this difference is
large and positive, and they are unrelated if it is negative. This line ofthinking was originally
suggested by Teece, Rumelt, Dosi and Winter (1994), but these authors only used it to
illustrate that coherence (non-randomness) was a salient attribute of the diversification
patterns of US firms. In other words, they did not make any attempt to evaluate this procedure
as a way of capturing inter-industry relatedness, which is what the present paper does.
Such a survivor-based procedure represents an abdication in terms of pinpointing what
relatedness is in specific instances, but could be potentially useful for studying what
relatedness does - in terms of intluencing other variables of interest (i.e. performance, entry
mode, financing decisions, organizational parameters, etc.). To investigate this survivor-based
approach to relatedness we compare two measures built on the conventional SIC-based
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measurement procedures with parallelmeasures derived from the survivor-based logic in
terms of explaining exit decisions by diversified firms. We submit that survivor-based
measures may be a useful complement to other approaches suggested in the literature. both
the conventional SIC-based measures and the more recent innovations (Farjoun, 1994:
Markides and Williamson. 1996: Robins and Wiersema. 1995: Silverman. 1999).
We proceed as follows: Section 2 summarizes the theoretical arguments behind the
relatedness hypothesis. and from this we derive the conditions necessary for the hypothesis to
hold. Section 3 discusses the most frequently used measurement procedures in existing
research. and point out that important theoretical conditions are not captured by these
procedures. Section 4 presents an alternative procedure based on the survivor logic. Two
variants of a survivor-based measure of relatedness are then developed. and hypotheses
contrasting these with equivalent measures based on the SIC-system are formulated. Section 5
discusses methodological issues. Section 6 presents our empirical findings. and section 7
concludes.
2. The Relatedness Hypothesis: The Theoretical Foundations
The relatedness hypothesis in its most rudimentary form states that multi-business firms that
are constructed with portfolios of businesses that are similar (related) will perform better than
portfolios of heterogeneous businesses. This immediately raises two questions. What are the
relevant kinds of similarity? And under which circumstances will such similarities provide
advantages for a diversifier that cannot be replicated by a non-diversifier or an unrelated
diversifier? The absolute minimum requirement for relevant similarity is that resources19 111
19 We do not distinguish between resources and competences here, and resources should be interpreted as
encompassing both
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one industry are substitutes or complements to resources in another. If neither of these
conditions are satisfied (either statically or dynamically) the word related in related
diversification seems without economic content. However. while they are necessary. they are
not sufficient.
To see this. let us first start with the classic situation involving resources that are substitutes
across industries (i.e. economies of scope). Consider a situation where a resource in industry
A is a perfect substitute for a resource in industry B. Under the standard microeconomic
assumption of perfectly divisible resources. this perfect substitutability does not provide any
advantage to a related diversifier active in both A and 8.20 In contrast. if the condition of
perfect divisibilityt' is relaxed. a potential advantage may exist because a single business finn
or an unrelated diversifier would be left with some costly excess capacity (Willig. 1979).
Penrose (1959) is usually regarded as the first to relax the assumption of perfect divisibility.
In her acclaimed account of the growth of firms she pointed out that excess capacity arises
both because some resources are inherently indivisible (i.e. half a truck) but more importantly
because firms in the course of their normal operations. as a result of learning. continuously
generate new resources - and excess capacity in existing resources. However. unless there is
some disadvantage associated with costly excess capacity for firms that do not pursue related
diversification. no performance differential can be expected. Accordingly. we must add the
condition that some indivisibilities exist.
However. Teece (1980. 1982) made the point that while the existence of indivisibilities
explains joint production. it does not explain why joint production must be organized within a
single firm. If the excess capacity created by indivisibilities can be traded in well functioning
markets. single business firms and unrelated diversifiers will face no disadvantage. They can
20 Disregarding for the moment issues of complementarity
21 In this we include as a special case the situation where the resource in question is a public input, so that excess
capacity will always exist
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simply sell or rent out their excess capacity, or alternatively. buy exactly the amount of
capacity they need from others. In such a situation the related diversifier may actually
compete at a disadvantage relative to single business firms, since related diversification will
normally involve some measure of weakened incentives. increased complexity, and added
overhead. However, the presence of some form of market failure can neutralize these
concerns, because missing markets or high transaction costs (Teece, 1980, 1982; Williamson,
1985) may make market contracting unfeasible.
Summing up. even if resources are perfect substitutes across industry boundaries. there is no
reason to expect the relatedness hypothesis to hold. unless there also exists some
indivisibilities that create an excess capacity problem for those not properly diversified. But
even when this is the case, unless trading in this excess capacity is subject to some form of
market failure. we should not expect the relatedness hypothesis to hold.
More recently. several authors have suggested a shift in focus from resource substitutability to
resource complementarity (Teecce et. al. 1994; Christensen and Foss, 1997: Foss and
Christensen, 2001 ). Complementarity refers to situations where there are positive externalities
(which essentially is a different form ofindivisibility) across industry boundaries. either
because the value of resources in one industry is positively affected by investments in
resources in another, or because decisions about how resources are used in one industry
affects how they should optimally be used in another. These positive spillovers create a
quantitative and qualitative coordination problem which may bestow an advantage on a
diversified finn (Richardson, 1972; Milgrom and Roberts 1992). This, however, requires that
that a diversified firm can solve the coordination problem in ways that a single business firm
or an unrelated diversifier cannot which in turn requires that some form of market failure
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exists. Hence, the condition ofmarket failure also applies in situations involving
complements.
Of particular importance to these authors are dynamic complementarities, which refers to an
ability to exploit diversity (i.e. resources residing in different businesses) to identify new ways
of combining existing resources. or speed up the development of new resources. The benefits
to similarity in this context would seem to arise because the magnitude of such dynamic
complementarities may be larger if the industries in question share some basic features
(March. 1991), and also because some commonalities may facilitate their exploitation
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1985). The amount of dynamic complementarity between industries
would therefore seem to depend on the balance between variety and similarity (Christensen
and Foss, 1997). Industries with the right balance between variety and similarity would be
expected to produce larger dynamic complementarities than industries that are either too
different or too similar.22
The implications for the relatedness hypothesis are that a portfolio of businesses with strong
inter-industry complementarities should be considered related (or coherent), and should
ceteris paribus outperform unrelated portfolios and single business firms. Given, of course,
that such firms cannot create and exploit complementarities equally well by means of market
contracting.
In sum, any kind of similarity between industries cannot be expected to bring about an
advantage to related diversifiers. lndivisibilities (either in the form of productive capacity or
positive externalities) must exist and market contracting must not leave an unrelated
22 It is pertinent to note that for instance Christensen and Foss (1997) deny that it is meaningful to discuss
relatedness between industries, since in their view relatedness is specific to the individual firm. We disagree with
this position, because we believe that there are important resource commonalities within industries, which makes
it meaningful to discuss relatedness between industries. However, we acknowledge that since there are also
resource differences inside industries, there is a firm specific component in relatedness. However, consistent
with most authors discussing the topic ofrelatedness, we focus on the inter-industry component ofrelatedness.
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diversifier or a single business finn equally well off. Unfortunately, to develop measures of
relatedness that screen effectively for these conditions in a convincing manner is extremely
challenging, and as we discuss in the next section, existing measures seem mainly to tap into
the degree to which resources in one industry can function as substitutes for resources in
another.
3. Existing Measures of Relatedness
Measures of relatedness within the existing strategic management research can be divided into
three major categories: categorical measures, continous SIC-based measures, and recent
developments. As argued below there are problems associated with all of these measures, in
particular with their ability to capture all the conditions specified in the preceding paragraph.
Categorical Measures
The categorical approach is dominated by the work of Rumelt (1974) which has become the
standard for the use of categorical measures. Based on three ratios, Rumelt classified
diversification strategies into four broad categories (nine if subcategories are included). These
were: single business firms, dominant business firms, related firms, and unrelated firms. The
ratios used for classification were:
• Specialization ratio: The proportion of a firm' s revenue that can be attributed to its largest
single business
• Related ratio: The proportion of a firm's revenue that can be attributed to its largest group
of related businesses
• Vertical ratio: The proportion of a firm's revenue that arise from all byproducts,
intermediate products, and end products of a vertically integrated sequence of processing
activities
An important element is the definition of what constitutes a related business, which
subsequently affects the related ratio. This was done subjectively using similarities in inputs,
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production technology, distribution channels and customers. As many others have pointed
out there are potential problems with this procedure. One is of course the reliability- and
intersubjectivity problems associated with the subjective element in the classifications,
another is that by measuring relatedness on a nominal level it only allows for comparisons of
within group averages and the procedure therefore becomes quite restrictive.
These concerns not withstanding, an equally important problem is that the procedure mainly
seems to capture the degree to which one can assume that resources are potential substitutes
across industry boundaries. This will probably be the case when there are "large similarities in
inputs, production technology, distribution channels and customers". The measure clearly
does not capture whether there are indivisibilities present for the substitutable resources, and
hence whether excess capacity is likely to develop, nor does it contain any notion of market
failure that makes contracting over the relevant resources costly. Both ofthese conditions
were above identified as necessary conditions for economies of scope to create an advantage
for the related diversifier, hence such a measure would be prone to exaggerate relatedness in
some instances (i.e. where resources are close substitutes, but these additional conditions are
not met). The implicit focus on similarities and economies of scope also raises the concem
that such a procedure may not capture (dynamic) complementarity well. which implies that it
willunderestimate relatedness in other instances (Foss and Christensen, 2001).
Given these shortcomings vis a vis the theoretical conditions, categorical measures have
important limitations in tenus of testing the relatedness-performance relationship, unless these
conditions are somehow otherwise controlled for.
Continous SIC-based Measures
The continous SIC-based measures are currently the most widely used approach (Robins and
Wiersema, 2003). They include measures such as the entropy index (Jaquemin and Berry,
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1979), and the concentric index (Caves, Porter and Spence. 1980)_23 The advantage of using
measures based on the SIC-system is that there is no subjective element in classifying the
degree of relatedness. and it also allows relatedness to be measured on an interval level. The
2,3 and 4-digit levels in the SIC-system are treated as points on an underlying scale of
relatedness, and arithmetic values are assigned to the distances. This allows for a wide range
of statistical operations. and use of the large amounts of secondary data available in the SIC-
format.
However, the use of distances in the SIC-system also introduces problems, in that it imposes
some very strong assumptions on the SIC-system. It assumes that industries are homogenous
within category levels, which is problematic ifthe breadth of the industry classifications vary.
In fact most observers agree that they do (Robins and Wiersema, 1995: Rumelt 1982). The
second assumption is that it assumes that there is equal dissimilarity between real industries
when they are equally distant within the SIC-hierarchy. This assumption is also problematic.
Our major point however, is that SIC-based measurements do not fare any better than the
categoricalmeasures in terms of capturing the conditions of indivisibility and market
failure.24 This means that even ifwe believe that there is a high correlation between distances
in the SIC-system and the degree to which resources are functional substitutes across
23 The concentric index is calculated as follows :
FDIVERSk = .E/'/d ~ P"pij
Where:
P/d = percentage of sales for :firm k in industry i
pkj = percentage of sales for :firm k in industry j
dij = weighting factor such that dij = O where i and j belong to the same 3-digit SIC-
category, dij= 1 where i andj belong to the same 2-digit category but different 3-digit
categories, and dij = 2 where i andjare in different 2-digit categories.
The related portion of entropy is calculated as follows:
ER = ET-Eu = EPTln(lIP"I} - EPuln(lIPU}
Where:
ER= Related component of entropy •
ET= Entropy defined at the 4-digit level
Eu = Entropy defined at the 2-digit level
PT= Percentage of sales in each 4-digit industry
Pu = Percentage of sales in each 2-digit industry
24 A study that does consider the condition of excess capacity is Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991).
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industries, the omission of these two conditions will imply that this kind of relatedness is
prone to be exaggerated. And according to Foss and Christensen (2001) the SIC-based
procedure has an implicit bias towards economies of scope, which indicates that it is not
likely to capture dynamic complementarities well. suggesting that this type of relatedness is
prone to be underestimated. The combined effect of over- and underestimation of relatedness
is that it becomes problernatic to test the relatedness-performance relationship using
continuous SIC-based measures.
Recent Developments
One possible avenue for closing the gap between theoretical conditions and measurement
would be to focus on categories of resources that are more likely than others to generate
excess capacity and positive externalities (i.e. imperfect divisibility), and be subject to market
failure. If such categories can be identified, similarities with respect to such resources should
be more likely to have a positive effect on the relative performance of a related diversifier.
One recent approach seems particularly promising in this respect. We are here referring to the
studies that use patent filings as an indication of technology flows between industries, which
in turn indicate to what extent technological resources in one industry are valuable in another
(Laursen and Meliciani, 2000; Robins and Wiersema, 1995; Silverman, 199925; Piscitello,
20(0). These studies seem to conformmore closely to theoretical predictions than the average
of the studies based on SIC-data and categorical measures, a finding which is possibly
explained by a better match with theoretical conditions. There are indeed reasons to believe
that technological resources are often imperfectly divisible, because several types of
technological resources -patents in particular- can be described as quasi-public goods. This
means that the use of such resources in one business does not preclude its use in another (if
2S A particularly interesting study is Silverman, 1999 which explicitly examines the influence of market failure
on patterns of diversification
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the technology or knowledge can be replicated at zero or low marginal cost). It is also
plausible that such technology flows are a reasonably good indicator of the extent to which
there are dynamic complementarities across industries. Finally. there are reasons to believe
that technological resources are often subject to market failure problems that make them
costly to trade (Teece, 1986). Some technological resources may have a tacit element which
makes contracts related to their transfer difficult to enforce. Alternatively. technological
resources may be easy to transfer. but the value they represent may be difficult to appropriate
once the content of the knowledge has been revealed to a potential buyer.
However. the procedure is not without limitations. First of all the measures using patent data
can only capture relatedness associated with technological resources. and do so in industries
where patenting is a non negligible phenomenon. This indicates some severe restrictions on
where these measures can be applied. and the forms of relatedness they can capture. In
addition these measures are probably noisy even under favorable circumstances. Not all
technological resources are quasi-public goods. for example ifthey are somehow linked to
knowledge that cannot be easily replicated. This can be the case if technology transfer
requires knowledge that cannot be separated from one or a group of individuals (due to for
example tacitness). The capacity ofthese individuals may be exhausted in existing
applications. leaving the condition of excess capacity unsatisfied. Also. there are several types
oftechnological resources where market trading is indeed feasible (Levin et al., 1987; Teece,
1986; Silverman. 1999). The phenomenon of licensing arrangements for technology and
patent trading illustrates this point.
In addition to the alternatives already presented. there is a plethora of less frequently used
measures. These include the use of human resource profiles (Farjoun, 1994). input ratios
(Montgomery and Hariharan, 1991). commodity flows (Fan and Lang. 2000). and more.
While these may vary in their ability to capture to what extent resources in one industry are
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substitutes or complements to resources in another. none of them ofTer a full solution for
capturing the conditions of indivisibility and market failure. In sum. all known alternatives for
measuring relatedness are flawed in terms of representing the theoretical developments with
respect to the relatedness hypothesis. The survivor-based approach we are about to suggest is
also less than perfect. but the question is whether it is less so than the alternatives.
4. A Survivor-based Approach to Relatedness
What has become known as the survivor principle (henceforth: SP) has as it core idea the
notion that the competitive process screens for efficiency - and does so well enough that a
sample of competitive firms will be dominated by the decisions or behaviors that are efficient
- at least in a comparative sense (Alchian, 1950: 211 )_26 Two key processes are given the
burden of ensuring this. One is that firms making negative profits will, unless some corrective
measure is taken. loose resources and ultimately become extinct. while firms making positive
profits will acquire resources and grow. The other is that the desire to make positive profits
provides a strong incentive for the less successful firms to imitate the more successful firms.
While few believe that the competitive process performs this screening perfectll7 the
behavior of researchers in the field of economics. organizational economics and strategic
management indicate quite an optimistic view of this process. After all theories or hypotheses
about what is efficient are routinely tested by measuring what firms actually do. which
indicates a belief in the basic conjecture of the SP. Examples include empirical tests of
transaction cost analysis. where for example the hypothesis that vertical integration is more
efficient than market governance when asset specificity is high, is tested by measuring
whether firms actually integrate when assert specificity is high (e.g. Joskow, 1985;
26 For the view that the competitive process creates outcomes that are optimizing, cfr. Friedman (1953).
27 Milton Friedman is a possible exception (Friedman, 1953).
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Monteverde and Teece, 1982). We also recognize it from agency theory where hypotheses
about the relative efficiency of alternative contracts are tested by measuring which contracts
firms actually employ (e.g. Anderson, 1985: Eisenhardt, 1985). And we recognize it from
studies of diversification within the strategic management literature, where for example
hypotheses about what constitutes efficient patterns of diversification are tested by measuring
their consistency with actual patterns of diversification (e.g. Farjoun, 1994; Montgomery and
Hariharan, 1991: Silverman, 1999).
If the basic conjecture of the survivor principle is valid, a measure of relatedness can be built
on the idea that what is related is what firms in competitive markets combine often. The
fundamental premise of this survivor-based approach to relatedness is thus that industries that
are related will be more frequently combined within a firm. More specifically, we estimate
how much the frequencies of actual combinations of four-digit SIC industries deviate from
what one would expect if diversification patterns were random. We take this difference to
constitute a survivor-based measure of the relatedness between a pair of industries.
A survivor-based measure of relatedness has the potential advantage that it incorporates the
knowledge of the best informed actors (which presumably are those making portfolio
decisions), but even iftheir information is poor, their decisions have been screened by the
competitive process, which will enforce a reversal of poor decisions. Therefore it is not
implausible that a survivor-based measure is better at capturing relatedness than the existing
alternatives. On the other hand, the behavior of decision makers is surely not optimal, and
screening function of the competitive process is surely not perfect either. A survivor-based
measure will therefore include noise. Several authors criticizing the SP, have indicated that
they believe the level of noise will be substantial (e.g. Elster, 1989; Hodgson, 1993: Winter
1971). However. in terms of measuring relatedness and testing the relatedness hypothesis the
existing alternatives involve substantial noise too. The question is therefore one of relative
74
noise, and the best judge on this issue is data. We now move on to describe in detail how a
survivor-based measure of relatedness can be constructed. Our approach is based on a
procedure originally developed by Teece. Rumelt, Dosi and Winter (1994).
Let the universe of diversified firms consist of K firms. each active in two or more of J
industries. Let ('ik = 1 if finn k is active in industry i. The number of industries participated in
by tinn k is 111k= ~;( 'ik and the number of diversified firms present in industry i is n, = ~k( 'ik.
Let .Iij be the number of diversified firms active in both industries i andr, such that
.fij = ~k C;kCjk. Thus.lij is a count of how often industries i and j are actually combined within
the same firm . .lij will be larger if industries i andj are related, but will also increase with n,
and 11j. To remove the effect of the size of industries i andr, the number .Z, is compared with
the number of expected combinations if diversification patterns were random.
The random diversification hypothesis can be operationalized as a hypergeometric situation
where a sample of size l1i is drawn (without replacement) from a population of K firms. Those
chosen are considered active in industry i. A second independent sample of size I1j is then
drawn from the population of K firms. Those chosen are considered active in industryj. The
number xij offirms active in both i andj is then a hypergeometric random variable with
population K, special members n, and sample size I1j. The distribution function for this
variable is then:
(:,)(~~: J
Pr(X, =x)=f .. (x,K,n"n;)= (~J
The mean and variance of Xij are:
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n·n
II .. = E(X ..) = _I_} ,
ry y K
a2 = (l -~) (_!i_)Pij K K -l .
A standardized measure of the relatedness between industries i and i is then constructed based
on the difference betweeri.Z, and f.1;j in the following fashion:
The measure SRij is thus a standardized measure of how much actual combinations exceed
expected combinations under the random diversification hypothesis. With this fundamental
measure of the relatedness between a pair of businesses it is possible to compute various
relatedness measures.
The two variants chosen here (elaborated below) reflect our choice of dependent variable,
which is the probability that a given business will be exited. The reason being that exit is a
performance measure not subject to manipulation or random variation, while for example
ROA is subject to both. Exit by closure is readily interpretable as a sign of performance below
expectations, while exit by divesture is an admittance of lower expected performance than the
acquirer. We expect a negative correlation between relatedness and the probability of exit for
two reasons. One is our belief that relatedness will have a positive impact on performance
(when the conditions specified above are met), the other is that we expect related businesses
to be more closely integrated with other businesses, making them more difficult to divest. In
comparing different measures of relatedness, our approach will be to compare their relative
ability to explain the probability that a given parent will exit a given business.
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The first measure captures the weighted average relatedness of a business i to all other
businesses in the parent portfolio. Assume a diversified finn that participates in 111 industries.
Its business in industry i has sales ofv, and survivor-based relatedness SRijwith industryj. The
weighted average relatedness SURVTOT; of the business in industry i to all other business in
the finn is then defined as:
" SR;.s.SURvrOT, = L..Ji'~i y J
I L S.
j'¢i J
A parallel measure based on SIC-distances can be obtained as follows:
Where dij= 2 if i andj are in the same 3-digit SIC codes
dij= l if i andj are in different 3-digit-. but the same 2 digit SIC codes
dij= O if i andj are in different 2-digit SIC codes
Note that this approach builds on the concentric index (Caves et al., 1980). but has been
modified to accommodate our choice of dependent variable (a precedent of this modified
concentric index is Sharma. 1998).
An altemative approach does not consider how related each business is to all other business in
the corporate portfolio. but how related each business is to the parent's core business
(measured as the largest 4-digit SIC code). Let SR;c be the survivor-based measure between a
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given industry i. and the core business c. In this measure we include consideration of the size
of the focal business (where size refers to share of the parent's total sales), and construct it so
that its value is high for large businesses close to the core business, and smaller for a small
businesses distant to the core business. This measure SURVCOREi is then defined as:
Again we also computed a parallel measure based on SIC-distances:
Where djc= 3 ifi = c
if i i- c and i and c are in the same 3-digit SIC codes
if i andj are in different 3-digit SIC-codes, but similar 2-digit SIC codes
if i and c are in different 2-digit SIC codes
Given these four measures: SURVTOTj, SICTOTj, SURVCOREj, and SICCOREj, we can
formulate the following hypotheses.
Hl: SURVTOTj will explain the probability exit significantly better than SICTOTj
H2: SURVCOREj will explain the probability exit significantly better than SICCOREj
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H3: SURVTOTj and SURVCOREj will both explain the probability of exit significantly
better than SICTOTj and SICCOREj
Note that while H I and H2 states that survivor-based measures of relatedness will perform
better than parallel measured based on SIC-data, H3 states that both survivor-based measures
will perform better than both SIC-based measures. Note also our expectation that all four
measures will be negatively signed.
5. Methodology
This study involved two distinct empirical operations. First we had to calculate the
fundamental survivor-based measure of relatedness SRij for all pairs of industries in the US
economy. With this fundamentalmeasure in hand we were able to calculate the survivor-
based measures SURVTOTj and SURVCOREj for any specific business belonging to any
specific parent. The second empirical operation was to conduct a test of our hypotheses.
linking these two measures and their SIC-based equivalents to the probability of exit.
5.1 Calculating ss,
To calculate SRij we used the AGSM/Trinet Large Establishment Database (Trinet). The
Trinet database contains records of all US establishments28 with more than 20 employees.
including variables such as four-digit SIC code. corporate ownership and sales. By
aggregating the establishments for each parent in each four digit sic-code. and the different
four digit sic-codes for each parent. and different parents for each four-digit SIC industry. we
are able to get a comprehensive picture of diversification patterns in the US-economy.
28 Trinet also includes foreign establishments in the US
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Comparison with the Census of Manufacturers indicate that Trinet contains 95% of all
establishments it should (Voight 1993). and that omissions are most likely for small firms
(which are less likely to be diversified), The primary measure of SRij was calculated from the
Trinet tiles of 1981. using all recorded firms active in two or more four-digit SIC-codes as a
basis. After deleting single business firms. government owned and non-profit industries, this
resulted in a total of 13.164 diversified firms, active in 929 different industries, covering a
total of 57.647 individual businesses. Of the 431.056 possible industry pairs, 122.105 were
observed. The measure of SRij between the observed industry pairs ranged from -7.97 to
93,55 with a mean of 433 and a standard deviation of 5,06. Based on these calculations of
SRij' we calculated measures of SURVTOTj and SURVCOREj by following the procedures
described in section 4.
4.2 Testing HI-H3
Sample
The sample for testing H l-H3 was derived as follows. We started out with all the 13164
diversified firms in the Trinet database. To obtain the necessary data for the variables of
interest Trinet data had to be merged with financial data from Compustat database. Since the
parent identity numbers in these two databases are different, the matching had to be done
alphanumerically by parent name. Spelling differences between the two databases resulted in
undisputable matches for 854 companies that had entries in all the years needed to compute
the variables. We believe this matching procedure to be a functional equivalent of random
sampling, since there is no reason to expect spelling matches of parent names in the two
databases to be biased in any particular way?9
29 The matching of Trinet and Compustat data creates a bias toward larger firms compared to Trinet data alone.
The reason for this is that Compustat contains publicly traded firms only, while Trinet contains both. Publicly
traded firms are on average larger than privately held firms.
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We imposed two further restrictions on our sample. One was to remove firms that where sold
or liquidated in their entirety between 1981 and 1985. The reason being that such actions do
not reveal information about the merits of combining different industries inside one finn.
while exiting some businesses and keeping others do. Finally. we restricted our sample to
firms that had more than 20 million dollars in sales in 1981. This resulted in a net sample of
70 firms. These 70 firms operated 2640 businesses in 466 different four-digit SIC codes in
1981. They exited a total of 593 industries betweerr'" 1981 and 1985. while they remained in
2024 industries throughout the period. and entered 738 industries.
To test our hypotheses we included all the 593 instances of exit. but rather than using the
entire sample of non-exits. we used the random sample generator in SPSS to select a sample
of non-exits of comparable size. State based sampling has been suggested as preferable to a
pure random sample when a population is overwhelmingly characterized by one state. and
will provide unbiased and consistent coefficients for all variables except the constant term
(McFadden and Manski, 1981). Thus the final sample consisted of a total of 1191
observations. 593 of which were exits. and 598 non-exits.
Statistical Method,'
In order to test H 1-H3 we developed a model of the relationship between the probability of
exit and relatedness. which controls for a number of industry- and parent variables that
previous research indicates may affect the exit decision. Our primary reason for including
these control variables is to reduce the risk that the performance of one or more of the
presented relatedness measures are inflated or deflated because of associations with such
"other" factors. but in addition. we include control variables because we are interested in
examining whether our data support the basic relatedness hypothesis. Given the dichotomous
30 Note that we are focusing on businesses a parent operated in 1981, which mayor may not have been exited by
the year 1985.
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nature of the dependent variable, a logistic regression analysis was considered appropriate for
testing our model. The general model is the following:
P(Exit=I) = Pl + /J2(1ndustry growth) + p3(lndustry concentration) + p4(lndustry profitability)
+ P5(Parent size) + P6(Parent market share) + fo(Parent leverage) + P8(Parent liquidity) +
~(Parent relatedness) + e
Industry Level Independent Variables
One possible influence on the exit decision is the profitability of the industry in question. All
things equal firms are presumably less likely to exit an industry with high average
profitability than one with low profitability. A negative relationship between relatedness and
the probability of exit should exist independent of such industry effects. This study controls
for three industry level variables that both theory and empirical research have found to affect
the attractiveness of an industry. These variables are: industry growth, industry concentration,
and industry profitability. Note that the latter variable, industry profitability, is included to
control for unspecified industry effects not captured by the two other industry level control
variables.
INDGRSAL. Industry growth is widely assumed to affect industry attractiveness favorably,
because it allows firms to grow without having to steal customers from competitors. Thus,
industry growth tends to soften competitive rivalry and raise the average profitability. Such a
relationship has been confirmed in numerous empirical studies (i.e. Kwoka and Ravenscraft
1986; Salinger, 1984; Schmalensee, 1989). One would accordingly expect a negative
relationship between the growth of an industry, and the probability of exit. The variable
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INDGRSAL is derived byestimating the growth in percent of industry sales between 1981
and 1985. as reported in Trinet.
INDCONC. Industry concentration has in standard 10 theory been argued to have a positive
relationship with industry profitability (Bain. 1956: Porter. 1980). The reason being that scale
economies and other sources of market power reduces the threat from potential entrants.
allowing incumbents more room to raise prices without inviting entry. Such a relationship has
found support in empirical studies (Bain, 1951: Montgomery. 1985: Weiss. 1974). but the
relationship between concentration and industry profitability remains controversial. since a
number of studies have failed to find such a relationship (see Schmalensee. 1989 for a
review). We expect a negative relationship between the industry concentration and the
probability of an industry being exited. The variable INDCONC is derived byestimating the
four-firm concentration ratio of each industry for 1981. based on Trinet Data.
INDPROF. Industry profitability may be affected by numerous other factors beyond growth
and concentration. To control for such unspecified factors we calculated a measure of the
median return on assets for each industry over the period 1980 - 1982. The procedure used
here calls for some elaboration. The Compustat database which was used to derive INDPROF
consists of a segment database which report ROA in four-digit SIC codes. and a corporate
database which report ROA on the firm level. We used all observations in the segment
database and all single business firms in the corporate database to calculate INDPROF.
However. this creates a problem because the ROA measures are not directly comparable over
these two databases. Because of incomplete asset allocation, ROA is systematically higher in
the segment database. To preserve observations we calculated the mean of all observations in
each database for each year. and we subsequently divided each individual observation by this
83
mean. Thus, the individual observations were standardized as deviations in percent from the
database mean for the relevant year. This allowed us to use observations from both databases
and all three years, and we subsequently calculated the median of this measure for each
industry. Where a minimum of five observations were obtained. this was done on the level of
four digit SIC-industries, if less than five observations were obtained the same measure was
calculated on the three digit level, if still less than five observations where obtained, the
measure was calculated on the two digit level (following Berger and Ofek, 1995). We expect
a negative relationship between INDPROF and the probability of exit.
Firm Level Independent Variables
In addition to industry level factors, we control for effects on the exit decision that are
attributable to other properties of the firm than that of relatedness. We control for four firm
level properties that both theoryand empirical research have found to affect exit decisions.
These variables are market share, parent size, parent leverage and parent liquidity.
MKTSH. A positive relationship between market share and profitability is documented in
a large number of empirical studies (e.g. Gale, 1971; Sheperd, 1972; Robins and Wiersema,
1995). There are numerous explanations for this relationship, ranging from market power
explanations through cost advantages due to learning curve effects and economies of scale.
Given these positive performance effects we expect firms to be less likely to exit a business
where they hold large market shares. The variable MKTSH is measured as firm sales in
industry; as percent of industry sales in 1981, and is expected to be signed negatively. The
data are based on the Trinet files.
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PARSIZE. The size of the parent has as noted been used as an indicator of market power
and economies of scale. In addition parent size is an indicator of a parent" s level of financial-
and other resources. Based on this we expect a negative relationship between parent size and
the probability of exit. The variable PARSIZE is measured as the total sales of the parent in
1981. based on Trinet data.
PARLEV. A highly leveraged parent may be under pressure from banks and investors to
sustain a high cash flow in the short term to avoid an excessive bankruptcy risk. This is likely
to reduce the patience with low performing businesses in the portfolio. Furthermore. a highly
leveraged firm may experience constraints in funding attractive investment opportunities.
Divesture of one business may therefore be an attractive way to finance investments in
another. Therefore we expect the leverage of the parent to be positively related to the
probabil ity of a business being exited. The variable PARLEY is measured as long term debt
to market value in 1981. The data were obtained from the Compustat database.
PARLIQ. A low current ratio may -like high leverage- indicate financial constraints that
makes exit more likely in order to reduce bankruptcy risk, or undertake divesture as a method
of financing investments in other businesses. We therefore expect the current ratio to be
negatively related to the probability of a business being exited. The variable PARLI Q is
measured as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities in 1981. Data were obtained from
the Compustat database.
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Relatedness Variables
The survivor-based relatedness measures employed in the test of H l-H3 have been presented
above. The measures used in testing HI is called SURVTOTj and SICTOTj and capture the
sales weighted average relatedness of the business i to al! other businesses in the parent k. We
expect SURVTOTj to perform better than SICTOTj. Note that the prefix "SURV" indicates a
survivor-based measure, while the prefix "SIC" indicates a SIC-based measure. The measures
used in testing H2 is called SURVCOREi, and SICCOREj and capture the sales wheighted
relatedness between the business i and the core business c of the parent. We expect
SURVCOREi, to perform better than SICCOREj. In testing H3 we include all four of these
measures, and we hypothesize that the two measures with the prefix "SURV" will perform
better than both measures with the prefix "SIC".
Dep. -ndent Variable
The dependent variable used to test H l and H2 is dichotomous. If a parent active in a four-
digit SIC code in 1981 has exited this business by 1985, the dependent variable is given a
value of l. If the parent is still active in the industry by 1985, the value assigned is O. Both
divestures and closures are thus considered to represent exit. The Trinet database was used to
identify exits and nonexits.
Variable definitions, datasources and predicted signs are summarized in Table I below, while
Table 2 shows the means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients for all independent
variables.
Insert table l and 2 about here
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6. Results
The results from the logistic regression analyses are presented in table 3. Table 3 contains five
different logistic regression models. Model I contains control variables only. Model 2
contains control variables plus the survivor-based measure SURVTOTj. Model 3 contains
control variables plus the equivalent SIC-based measure SICTOTj. Model 4 contains control
variables plus the survivor-based measure SURVCOREj. Model 5 contains control variables
plus the equivalent SIC-based measure SICCOREj.
Insert table 3 about here
As shown in table 3 all four relatedness measures are negatively signed and significant. but
we note that while the two SIC-based measures are significant at the 0.05 level, both survivor-
based measures are significant at the 0,001 level. Looking at the Wald statistics we also note
that the survivor-based variable SURVTOTj has the highest level of significance of all the
variables included in this study.
H l predicted that model 2 would explain the probability of exit significantly better than
model 3. This hypothesis is strongly supported. Allmeasures of model performance improve
substantially when the measure SURVTOTj is substituted for SICTOTj. The model chi-
square improves by 62,88, an improvement which is significant at the 0,00 l level. The two
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pseudo / measures increase by 48% (Cox and Snell ,.2) and 47.3% (Nagelkerke ,.1)
respectively. We interpret this as support for Hl.
H2 predicted that model 4 would explain the probability of exit significantly better than
model 5. This hypothesis is also strongly supported. All measures ofmodel performance
improve substantially when the measure SURVCOREj is substituted for SICCOREj. The
model chi-square improves by 33.78. again the improvement is significant at the 0.00 l level.
The two pseudo r'' measures increase by 21.7% (Cox and Snell 1'2) and 21.6% (Nagelkerke ,.2)
respectively. We interpret this as support for H2.
H3 predicted that both survivor-based measures would perform significantly better than both
SIC-based measures. This hypothesis is supported ifthe lowest performing survivor-based
measure performs significantly better than the best performing SIC-based measure. As shown
in table 3 the lowest performing survivorbased measure is SURVCOREj while the best
performing SIC-based measure is SICCOREj. The test ofH3 therefore reduces to the same
test as H2. which was strongly supported. We therefore conclude that H3 is also strongly
supported.
Another point worthy of mentioning is that the measure SURVTOTj performs better than the
measure SURVCOREj. The increase in model chi-square when moving from SURVCOREj
to SURVTOTj is 6.97 which is significant at the 0.01 level. In our opinion this indicates that
there are positive effects of relatedness that extends beyond the relationship between a
business and the core business of the parent. and that the noted differences between model 2
and 4 reflect this. More specifically. SURVCOREj performs below SURVTOTj because
WARN restricts relatedness effects to the core business in the parent portfolio.
While Hl - H3 did receive strong support. some of the control variables did not behave as
expected. This was particularly the case for industry concentration (INDCONC). which was
expected to be negatively related to the probability of exit. but instead a significant (though
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marginally) positive relationship was found. Although surpnsmg, this finding does have
precedents (Schmalensee, 1989). One reason may be that concentrated industries are difficult
to enter. and that some of the exits in our sample are in fact unsuccessful entry attempts.
Another possibility is that concentrated industries are less glamorous than they are rumored to
be. The conditions that cause concentration may also cause intense rivalry. For example the
presence of substantial fixed costs will typically induce concentration. but it also tends to
make battles for market share more intense. Thus episodes of intense competition may break
out which hurt all incumbents. but smaller firms in particular. As a result these smaller firms
may exit by closing down. by divesture to a larger finn. or by merger with other small firms
to gain economies of scale. To test this we split the sample in two based on market share.
which resulted in a significant positive relationship between concentration and probability of
exit for the sub sample with the smallest market shares. and no relationship for the subsample
with the largest market shares.
Another surprising finding was the insignificant relationship between industry profitability
and the probability of exit. There may be several factors contributing to this finding. One
reason may associated with what Goold et al. (1994) called the parenting advantage criterion.
This criterion states that a business should be sold when the current owners are not the best
possible owners. because the better owners will be willing to pay more than the current ones
can expect from continued ownership. Abiding by this criterion would weaken the tendency
to retain a business because it is profitable or in a profitable industry. Secondly. the
distribution of profitability in high retum industries may be highly skewed. such that even if
the profitability of the median firm is high. it covers a tale of low profitability firms.
Unfortunately the Compustat data used to construct the industry profitability measures in this
study are to coarse to explore this possibility further. Thirdly. our results may simply be an
artifact of these limitations in the underlying data.
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Finally we may note that parent size. parent leverage and parent liquidity did not reach
significance either. This is somewhat less surprising since the number of parents included in
the final sample was 70. Thus we may lack sufficient statistical power to capture effects of the
sizes associated with these variables.
7. Conclusions and Caveats
In sum. our findings are that the survivor-based measures outperform equivalent SIC-based
measures in terms of explaining the probability of a business being exited. Our findings also
indicate support for the relatedness hypothesis. since our data shows that relatedness does
reduce the probability of a business being exited. However. in drawing these conclusions
some caution is warranted,
One reason for caution is that exit may be influenced by other factors then efficiency. Some
would argue that the early 1980s was a period where refocusing and de-conglomeration was
increasingly fashionable, and that the exits decisions observed here may be more influenced
by fashion and herd behavior than efficiency. This is both a threat to interpreting our findings
as support for the relatedness hypothesis. but more importantly, it can be the case that the
survivor-based measures perform better than the SIC-based measures because they capture
such herd behavior better. Our data can not rule out this possibility. but a weak indication
against a pure herd behavior interpretation is the fairly high positive correlation between the
relatedness measures and market share (ranging from 0,20 to 0.3 7).
Another alternative interpretation is that the survivor-based measures outperform the SIC
based measures because of contamination from motives associated with multipoint
competition and mutual forbearance. This refers to a tendency among firms competing across
several markets to instigate a balance of terror where competition is less aggressive than it
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would have been otherwise (Edwards, 1955: Gimeno, 1999; Greve and Baum, 2001). Firms
may refrain from exiting a weak position in one industry because maintaining this position is
important to protect gains from mutual forbearance in another. Or in other words: the firm
remains in the weak business not because it is reaping gains from relatedness, but because
remaining there is a perquisite for low levels of rivalry elsewhere. The way the survivor-based
measures are constructed makes them particularly well suited to capture such motives, since
they are indeed built from a count of frequencies of multi market contact. SIC-based measures
are not equally sensitive to these motives, because they are not constructed on the basis of
multi market contact. One may therefore speculate that the superior ability of the survivor-
based approach to explain exit is not due to relatedness, but to a particular sensitivity to the
motives of creating and exploiting benefits from mutual forbearance.
Future work should focus on examining these two alternative interpretations of our findings.
as well as testing the survivor-based measures against other dependent variables which
relatedness is supposed to affect. Examples of the latter may include both patterns of entry
and other performance measures than exit (e.g. ROA, Tobins q. sales growth. etc.). And of
course it would be desirable with replications using data from other periods and other places.
These important caveats not withstanding. it is our interpretation that given the current
mismatch between available methodological tools and theoretical developments, the findings
reported here strongly suggests that survivor-based measures can make a valuable
contribution to research on how relatedness affects other variables of interest (i.e. what
relatedness does).
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Relatedness and Patterns of Diversification: A Survivor-based Approach
Abstract
This study addresses the impact of relatedness on patterns of corporate diversification. More
specifically we compare a survivor-based approach to measuring relatedness with the
conventional SIC-based approach in terms of explaining which industries a firm diversifies
into. Our findings show that the survivor-based approach is substantially superior in terms of
explaining entry decisions by diversified firms. These findings complement the recent
observations that survivor-based measures ofrelatedness outperform SIC-based measures in
terms of explaining exit decisions by diversified firms. and thus strengthen the claim that
survivor-based measures of relatedness can make a valuable contribution to research on
diversification and corporate strategy.
100
1. Introduction
No variable within research on diversification and corporate strategy has been given an
amount of attention greater than that of relatedness. A sizable share of this attention concerns
how relatedness should be measured (Caves. Porter and Spence. 1980: Chatterjee and
Blocher. 1992: Fan and Lang. 2000: Farjoun, 1994: Hoskisson et al., 1993: Jacquemin and
Berry. 1979; Markides and Williamson. 1994. 1996; Montgomery and Hariharan, 1991:
Robins and Wiersma. 1995. 20(3). Several authors have pointed to a gap between theoretical
conditions and the way relatedness is operationalized, and suggest this as the main cause of
inconsistencies between theoretical predictions and empirical findings in the existing
literature (Markides and Williamson. 1994. 1996: Robins and Wiersma. 1995). In practice.
however. this gap is extremely difficult to close.
Recently. Lien (2003) suggested a different approach towards narrowing this gap. Building on
work by Teece et al. (1994). he tested a survivor-based approach to measuring relatedness.
and found that survivor-based measures performed significantly better than SIC-based
measures in terms of explaining the exit decisions of diversified firms (exit was used as a
performance measure). This study extends this work by comparing survivor-based measures
with SIC-based measures in terms of explaining entry decisions.
A survivor-based approach to measuring relatedness means that what is related is what firms
in competitive markets combine often. More specifically it implies that a measure of the
relatedness between a pair of industries can be obtained by considering how often they are
actually combined inside a finn - compared to what one would expect if diversification
patterns were random. Industries are related when this difference is large and positive. and
they are unrelated ifit is negative. This line ofthinking was originally suggested by Teece,
Rumelt, Dosi and Winter (1994). but these authors only used it to illustrate that coherence
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(non-randomness) was a salient attribute of the diversification patterns of US firms. Apart
from the noted study by Lien (2003) - which focused on exit decisions - the procedure has to
our knowledge not been evaluated as a method of capturing inter-industry relatedness.
We proceed as follows: Section 2 discusses whether entry decisions can be used to compare
measures of relatedness. Section 3 discusses the limitations of the most frequently used
relatedness measures. Section 4 presents an alternative procedure based on the survivor logic.
Two variants of a survivor-based measure of relatedness are then developed, and hypotheses
contrasting these with equivalent measures based on the SIC-system are formulated. Section 5
discusses methodological issues. Section 6 presents our empirical findings, and section 7
concludes.
2. Can Entry Decisions be Used to Compare Measures of Relatedness?
This study relies in a crucial way on three postulates:
l) Relatedness matter for performance
2) Performance matter for decision makers
3) Decision makers have relevant information about relatedness
Based on these postulates we suggest that actions taken by decision makers (i.e. entry
decisions) contain information about true relatedness, and accordingly, that relatedness
measures can be compared by their relative ability to explain actual entry decisions. Our
motive for formulating these postulates is that entry decisions have not been screened by the
competitive process. Therefore we cannot rely on the competitive process to sort between
efficient and inefficient decisions. In contrast, if our dependent variable was a performance
measure, such as exit or ROA, or any other variable that is measured after the competitive
process has been set to work, we would not necessarily have to resort to postulate 2 and 3. If
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our belief in the effectiveness of the competitive process was sufficiently strong. we could
rely on this process to produce outcomes as ;/these postulates were empirically true (Alchian.
1950: Friedman. 1953). However. since our dependent variable is ex ante to competition. we
cannot make such a claim?1 Yet. if data on actual entry decisions are to be of use as a way of
comparing relatedness measures. all three postulates must be included. We shall therefore
devote some space to arguing why we consider each of the three postulates plausible (one
should also note that there are several widely cited precedents for using patterns of entry as
evidence of the beneficial effects of relatedness. e.g. Farjoun. 1994: Montgomery and
Hariharan. 1991: Silverman. 1999).
2.1 Relatedness and Performance
The classic "economies of scope" view of why and when relatedness matters for performance
involves three conditions. The first is that the entrant possesses some resources that are
functional substitutes for resources in the target industry (below we expand the discussion to
include situations involving complementarity). This condition ensures that the entrant
possesses some resources that are relevant in the destination industry.
The second is that there are some indivisibilities associated with these resources. so that the
entrant possesses some excess capacity. This criterion is usually attributed to Penrose (1959).
Penrose highlighted that firms in the course of their normal operations. as a result of learning.
continuously generated new resources - and excess capacity in existing resources. To the
extent that resources are not fully exploited in existing businesses - they can be deployed at
low marginal cost in a new business. Conversely. ifno excess capacity exists. a diversified
firm would have no efficiency advantages over an independent start up. and probably some
31 Note, however, that the key independent variables (the survivor-based relatedness measures) are ex post to
screening by the competitive process.
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disadvantages vis a vis incumbents in the destination industry (assuming some entry barriers
exist).
The third is that there must exist some form of market failure for trading in this excess
capacity (Teece. 1980. 1982). Ifthe relevant excess capacity could be sold or rented out in
well functioning markets. this would probably be preferable to full scale diversification. Full
scale diversification wiIl normally involve some degree of weakened incentives, increased
complexity. added overhead. and a need to acquire additional resources at full cost. However.
the presence of some form of market failure can neutralize these concerns because missing
markets and high transaction costs may make market contracting unfeasible as a way to
capitalize on excess capacity (Teece, 1980. 1982: Williamson. 1985).
More recently. several authors have argued for a shift in focus from resource substitutability
and excess capacity. to resource complementarity (Christensen and Foss. 1997: Foss and
Christensen. 200 l: Teece et al., 1994). Complementarity refers to situations where there are
positive externalities (which essentially is a different form of indivisibility) across industry
boundaries. For example because the value of assets in one industry is affected positively by
the level and uses of assets in another. This creates a quantitative and qualitative coordination
problem. and a tinn may diversify to better exploit such positive externalities (Richardson.
1972).32 However. this requires that a diversified firm can solve this coordination problem in
ways that a single business firm cannot. which in turn requires that some form of market
failure exists (Milgrom and Roberts. 1992). Hence. the condition ofmarket failure also
applies in situations involving complementarity.
In sum. any kind of similarity between industries cannot be expected to bring about a positive
relationship between relatedness and performance. Indivisibilities (either in the form of
32 Or to explore the existence of such complementarities and develop new ones (Foss and Christensen, 200 l;
Klein and Klein, 2001).
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productive capacity or positive externalities) must exist and market contracting must not
leave a single business finn or an unrelated diversifier equally well off Unfortunately. as will
be discussed in section 3. developing measures of relatedness that screens for these conditions
in a convincing manner is extremely difficult.
2.2 Performance and Decision Makers
We believe that those making diversification decisions are very much concerned with the
performance outcomes of their diversification decisions. Diversification decisions are highly
visible decisions. which if proven unsuccessful could damage both the compensation. job
security and reputation ofthose responsible. We certainly acknowledge that decision makers
may have other goals than economic performance (Jensen and Meckling. 1976). including
maximizing the size of the firm (Mueller. 1969). excessive reductions in bankruptcy risk
(Amihud and Lev. 1981). and more. However. two reasons lead us to believe that expected
performance remains the dominant criterion. First of all a manager maximizing growth or
some other managerial benefit is likely to choose the most profitable opportunities first
(Montgomery. 1994). Secondly. the early nineteen eighties. which is the time frame focused
in this study. was a period where unrelated diversification was becoming increasingly
"unfashionable" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Thus. it seems reasonable that the pursuit of
unrelated diversification was both more likely to be met with resistance from board members
and owners. and more likely to be costly in terms of negative responses from capital markets
and other stakeholders. than earlier periods.
In sum. while acknowledging that some diversification moves may be influenced by other
motives than expected performance. we believe that expected performance is the dominant
criterion used by decision makers. Thus. the decisions they make contain information about
what they believe is the best course of action in terms of expected performance. However. we
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stress that since our task is to compare different measures of relatedness. it is much more
important that the different relatedness measures we compare do not correlate systematically
different with such other motives. than it is to conclude that such motives are insignificant.
! ....... .) Decision Makers Have Relevant Information About Relatedness
Decision makers making entry decisions are human beings. and therefore subject to bounded
rationality and various biases. Nevertheless. we believe that these decision makers do not act
randomly. and that such high profile and high commitment decisions as the entry into a new
industry are usually the subject of considerable analysis and reflection. Therefore we believe
that the entry decisions they make contain information - not only about perceived relatedness
- but also about ..true" relatedness. Again. however. what is important is not that biases and
bad judgements are absent. but that these do not correlate systematically different with the
relatedness measures we compare.
3. Problems with the Existing Measures of Relatedness
The most frequently used measures of relatedness in existing research are categorical
measures and continuous SIC-based measures. As argued below there are problems associated
with both of these measures. in particular with their ability to capture all the conditions
specified in section 2.1.
Categorical Measures
The categorical approach is dominated by the work of Rumelt (1974) which has become the
standard for the use of categorical measures. Based on three ratios. Rumelt classified
diversification strategies into four broad categories. These were: single business firms.
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dominant business firms. related firms. and unrelated firms. The ratios used for classification
were:
• Specialization ratio: The proportion of a finn's revenue that can be attributed to its largest
single business
• Related ratio: The proportion of a finn' s revenue that can be attributed to its largest group
of related businesses
• Vert ica l rut io: The proportion of a firm' s revenue that arise from all byproducts.
intermediate products. and end products of a vertically integrated sequence of processing
activities
An important element is the definition of what constitutes a related business. which
subsequently affects the related ratio. This was done subjectively using similarities in inputs.
production technology. distribution channels and customers. As many others have pointed
out. there are potential problems with this procedure. One is of course the reliability- and
intersubjectivity problems associated with the subjective element in the classifications.
another is that by measuring relatedness on a nominal level it only allows for comparisons of
within group averages and the procedure therefore becomes quite restrictive.
These concerns not withstanding. an equally important problem is that the procedure mainly
seems to capture the degree to which one can assume that resources are potential substitutes
across industry boundaries. This will probably be the case when there are "large similarities in
inputs. production technology. distribution channels and customers". The procedure looms
silent on the likelihood that such resources are imperfectly divisible. and hence whether
excess capacity is likely to develop. nor does it contain any notion of market failure that make
contracting over the relevant resources costly. Both ofthese conditions were above identified
as necessary conditions for economies of scope to create an advantage for a related diversifier.
hence such a measure would be prone to exaggerate relatedness in some instances (i.e. where
resources are close substitutes, but these additional conditions are not met). The implicit focus
on similarities and economies of scope also raises the concern that such a procedure may not
capture complementarity well. which implies that it will underestimate relatedness in other
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instances (Foss and Christensen. 2001). Given these shortcomings vis a vis the theoretical
conditions. categorical measures have important limitations in terms of isolating the
theoretically salient types of relatedness.
Continous SIC <based Measures
The continous SIC-based measures are currently the most widely used approach (Robins and
Wiersma. 2003). they include measures such as the entropy index (Jaquemin and Berry.
1979). and the concentric index (Caves. Porter and Spence. 1980).33 The advantages ofusing
measures based on the SIC-system are that there is no subjective element in classifying the
degree of relatedness. and it also allows relatedness to be measured on an intervallevel. The
2. 3 and 4-digit levels in the SIC-system are treated as points on an underlying scale of
relatedness. and arithmetic values are assigned to the distances. This allows for a wide range
ofstatistical operations. and use of the large amounts ofsecondary data available in the SIC-
format.
However the use of distances in the SIC-system also introduces problems. in that it imposes
some very strong assumptions on the SIC-system. It assumes that industries are homogenous
within category levels. which is problematic ifthe breadth of the industry classifications vary.
percentage of sales for firm k in industry i
percentage of sales for firm k in industry j
weighting factor such that dij = O where i and j belong to the same 3-digit SIC-
category, dij= 1 where i andj belong to the same 2-digit category but different 3-digit
. categories, and dij= 2 where i andjare in different 2-digit categories.
The related portion of entropy is calculated as follows:
ER = ET-Eu = EPTln(IIPr) - EPuln(IIPU}
Where:
ER = Related component of entropy
ET = Entropy defined at the 4-digit level
Eu = Entropy defined at the 2-digit level
PT = Percentage of sales in each 4-digit industry
Pu = Percentage of sales in each 2-digit industry
33 The concentric index is calculated as follows :
FDIVERSk = sr; 11P",dij
Where:
Pk;=
Pkj=
dij=
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In fact most observers agree that they do (Robins and Wiersma. 1995: Rumelt, 1982). The
second assumption is that it assumes that there is equal dissimilarity between real industries
when they are equally distant within the SIC-hierarchy. This assumption is also problematic.
Our major point however. is that SIC-based measurements do not fare any better than the
categoricalmeasures in terms of capturing the conditions of indivisibility and market failure_]4
This means that even if we believe that there is a high correlation between distances in the
SIC-system and the degree to which resources are potential substitutes across industries. the
omission of these two conditions will imply that this kind of relatedness is prone to be
exaggerated. And according to Foss and Christensen (2001) the SIC-based procedure has an
implicit bias towards economies of scope. which indicates that it is not likely to capture
complementarities well. suggesting that this type of relatedness is prone to be underestimated.
The combined effect of over- and underestimation of relatedness is that the continuous SIC-
based measures are quite crude in terms of capturing the types of relatedness theory suggest is
important.
In sum. there are substantial problems with both the categorical and continuous relatedness
measures. The survivor-based approach we are about to suggest is also less than perfect but
our goal is to examine whether it is less so than the alternatives.
4. The Alternative: A Survivor-based Approach to Relatedness
As indicated above. our intention is to compare continuous SIC-based measures of relatedness
with survivor-based measures of relatedness in terms of explaining the entry decisions made
by diversified firms. We now elaborate on the reasoning behind the survivor-based approach.
and how the survivor-based measures are constructed.
34 A study that does consider the condition ofexcess capacity is Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991).
109
The fundamental survivor-based measure relies crucially on what has become known as the
survivor principle (henceforth: SP). The SP has as it core idea the notion that the competitive
process screens for efficiency - and does so well enough that a sample of competitive firms
will be dominated by the decisions or behaviors that are efficient - at least in a comparative
sense (Alchian, 1950:211 )_JsTwo key processes are given the burden of ensuring this. One is
that firms making negative profits will, unless some corrective measure is taken. loose
resources and ultimately become extinct. while firms making positive profits will acquire
resources and grow. The other is that the desire to make positive profits provides a strong
incentive for the less successful firms to imitate the more successful firms. While few believe
that the competitive process performs this screening perfectll6 the behavior of researchers in
the field of economics. organizational economics and strategic management indicate quite an
optimistic view of this process. After all theories or hypotheses about what is efficient are
routinely tested by measuring what firms actually do. which indicates a belief in the basic
conjecture of the SP (i.e. that competitive markets display what is efficient).
If the SP works. a measure of relatedness can be built on the idea that what is related is what
firms in competitive markets combine often. The fundamental premise ofthis is in other
words that industries that are related will be more frequently combined within a finn. More
specifically. we estimate how much the frequencies of actual combinations offour-digit SIC
industries deviate from what one would expect if diversification patterns were random. We
take this difference to constitute a survivor-based measure of the relatedness between a pair of
industries.
The potential advantage of this survivor-based measure is that it incorporates the knowledge
of the best informed actors (which presumably are those making portfolio decisions). but even
iftheir information is poor. their decisions have been screened by the competitive process.
35 For the view that the competitive process creates outcomes that are optimizing, cfr. Friedman (1953).
36 Milton Friedman is a possible exception (Friedman, 1953).
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which will enforce a reversal of poor decisions. Therefore it is not implausible that a survivor-
based measure is better at capturing relatedness than the existing alternatives (note here that it
is critical to distinguish between the survivor-based measures of relatedness we use. which
have been screened by the competitive process. and the entry decisions we use those
relatedness measures to analyze. which have not been subject to the competitive process).
On the other hand. the behavior of decision makers is surely not optimal, and screening
function of the competitive process is surely not perfect either. A survivor-based measure will
therefore include noise. Several authors criticizing the SP. have indicated that they believe the
level ofnoise will be substantial (e.g. Elster. 1989: Hodgson. 1993: Winter. 1971). However.
in terms of measuring relatedness the existing alternatives involve substantial noise too. The
question is therefore one of relative noise. and the best judge on this issue is data. We now
move on to describe in detail howa survivor-based measure of relatedness can be constructed.
Our approach is based on a procedure originally developed by Teece, Rumelt, Dosi and
Winter (1994).
Let the universe of diversified firms consist of K firms. each active in two or more of l
industries. Let Cik = l if finn k is active in industry i. The number of industries participated in
by firm k is 111k= LiCk and the number of diversified firms present in industry i is ni = LkC 'ik.
Let .Ii} be the number of diversified firms active in both industries i and j. such that
.Ii} = Lk CikCjk. Thus.li} is a count of how often industries i andj are actually combined within
the same tinn . .Ii} will be larger if industries i and j are related. but will also increase with ni
and n}. To remove the effect of the size of industries i andr. the numbcr .Z, is compared with
the number of expected combinations if diversification patterns were random.
The random diversification hypothesis can be operationalized as a hypergeometric situation
where a sample of size ni is drawn (without replacement) from a population of K firms. Those
Il I
chosen are considered active in industry i. A second independent sample of size I1j is then
drawn from the population the population of K firms. Those chosen are considered active in
industryj. The number xij offirms active in both i andj is then a hypergeometric random
variable with population K. special members 11; and sample size llj. The distribution function
for this variable is then:
The mean and variance ofXij are:
11·11 .
//..= E(X ..) =_'_l .
ry y K
0'2 = ..(l-!::!_) (_£_)
IJy K K -l .
A standardized measure of the relatedness between industries i andj is then constructed based
on the difference betweerr.Z, and f.J;j in the following fashion:
The measure SRij is thus a standardized measure of how much actual combinations exceed
expected combinations under the random diversification hypothesis. With this fundamental
measure of the relatedness between a pair of businesses it is possible to compute various
relatedness measures. The two variants chosen here reflect our choice of dependent variable.
which is the probability that a given diversified finn will enter a given industry. Thus. we
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wish to develop measures that cast light on the relatedness between a candidate industry.
which is subsequently either entered or not entered. and the industries present in the parent
portfolio.
The first measure captures the weighted average relatedness of a potential destination industry
i to all other businesses in the parent portfolio. Assume a diversified firm that participates in
111 industries. Its business in industryj has sales 01'.\] and survivor-based relatedness SRijwith
industry i. The weighted average relatedness SURVTOTj of the target industry i to all other
business in the firm is then defined as:
" SR..s .
SURVTOT = LJ IJ J
I L Sl
A parallel measure based on SIC-distances can be obtained as follows:
Where dij= 2 if i andr are in the same 3-digit SIC codes
dij= l if i andr are in different 3-digit-, but the same 2 digit SIC codes
dij= O if i andj are in different 2-digit SIC codes
Note that this approach builds on the concentric index (Caves et al., 1980). but has been
modified to accommodate our choice of dependent variable (a precedent ofthis modified
concentric index is Sharma. 1998).
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An alternative approach does not consider how related a destination industry is to u/l other
business in the corporate portfolio. but how related it is to the two closest neighboring
businesses of the parent. The approach here is to rank the survivor-based measure S'Rij
between the destination industry i. and all other industries in the parent portfolio. The two
industries with the highest measure of SRij are considered the neighboring businesses. Let Aij
= I for a business that is defined as a neighbor to business i. and Aij = Ofor those that are not.
The weighted average relatedness of neighbors to business i is then defined by:
Again. we also computed a parallel measure based on SIC-distances:
Where dij= 2 if i andj are in the same 3-digit SIC codes
dij= 1 if i andj are in different 3-digit-. but the same 2-digit SIC codes
dij= O if i andj are in different 2-digit SIC codes
4= I if businessj is defined as a neighbor to business i37
if businessj is not defined as a neighbor to business i
37 Note that we resorted to the following procedure when business were equidistant from the target industry: First
we identified the closest neighbor, if several where equidistant, we used the sales of the largest business to
compute sales weights. Then we identified the second closest. If there were several second closest firms, we
chose the smallest of these. This was done to reflect our assumption that one would expect closer cooperation
with the closest neighbor than the second closest. This procedure implies that when the closeness to the two
neighbors differed, we weighted our measure in favor of the closest of the two.
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An example may clarify this latter measure. Assume that the two closest related industries of
a parent are one in the same 3-digit SIC code (dij= 2). and one in the same 2-digit code (dij=
I).And assume further that the relative size ofthese businesses (sf) implies that they are
weighted with 75% and 25% respectively. The measure SICNBOR; will then be found as
follows:
SICNBOR; = 2 * 0.75 + 1 * 0.25 = 1.75
Given these four measures: SURVTOT;. SICTOT;. SURVNBOR;. and SICNBOR;. we can
formulate the following hypotheses.
Hl: SURVTOT; will explain the probability of entry significantly better than SICTOT;
H2: SURVNBOR; will explain the probability of entry significantly better than SICNBOR;
H3: SURVTOT; and SURNBOR; will both explain the probability of entry significantly
better than SICTOT; and SICNBOR;
Note that while Hl and H2 states that survivor-based measures of relatedness will perform
better than parallelmeasured based on SIC-data. H3 states that both survivor-based measures
will perform better than both SIC-based measures. Note also our expectation that all four
measures will be positively signed.
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5. Methodology
This study involves two distinct empirical operations. First we had to calculate the
fundamental survivor-based measure of relatedness SRij for all possible pairs of industries in
the US economy. With this measure in hand we were able to calculate the survivor-based
measures SURVTOTj and SURVNBORj for any specific business belonging to any specific
parent. The second empirical operation is to conduct a test of our hypotheses linking these
two measures and their SIC-based equivalents to the probability of a given parent entering a
given industry.
5.1 Calculating SRij
To calculate SRij we used the AGSM/Trinet Large Establishment Database (Trinet). The
Trinet database contains records of all US establishments with more than 20 employees.38
including variables such as four-digit SIC code. corporate ownership and sales. By
aggregating the establishments for each parent in each four digit sic-code. and the different
four digit sic-codes for each parent. and different parents for each four-digit SIC industry. we
are able to get a comprehensive picture of diversification patterns in the US-economy.
Comparison with the Census of Manufacturers indicate that Trinet contains 95% of all
establishments it should (Voight. 1993). and that omissions are most likely for small firms
(which are less likely to be diversified). The primary measure of SRij was calculated from the
Trinet files of 1981. using all recorded firms active in two or more four-digit SIC-codes as a
basis. After deleting single business firms. government owned and non-profit industries. this
resulted in a total of 13.164 diversified firms. active in 929 different industries. covering a
total of 57.647 individual businesses. Of the 431.056 possible industry pairs. 122.105 were
38 Trinet also includes foreign establishments in the US
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observed. The measure of SRi.i between these ranged from -7.97 to 93.55 with a mean of 4.33
and a standard deviation of 5.06. But note that we also calculated SRij for industry pairs that
where not combined by 1981. because some of these where combined in the subsequent
periods where we observed entry or nonentry, and because some of the randomly chosen non-
entries created a need to calculate SRij for industry pairs that were never combined. However.
it is not in any way problematic to calculate this measure for unobserved combinations. All
this implies is that the number of observed combinations (.lij) is set to zero in the formula for
calculating SRij. Based on these calculations of SRij. we were able to calculate measures of
SURVTOTi and SURVNBORi by following the procedures described in section 4.
5.2 Testing H l-H3
Sample
The sample for testing HI-H3 was derived as follows. We started out with all the 13164
diversified firms in the Trinet database. To obtain the necessary data for all the variables of
interest. Trinet data had to be merged with financial data from Compustat database. Since the
parent identity numbers in these two databases are different. the matching had to be done
alphanumerically by parent name. Spelling differences between the two databases resulted in
undisputable matches for 854 companies that had entries in all the years needed to compute
the variables. We believe this matching procedure to be a functional equivalent of random
sampling. since there is no reason to expect spelling matches of parent names in the two
databases to be biased in any particular way_39
We imposed three further restrictions on our sample. One was to remove all firms with sales
below $ lO million dollars. the second was to remove firms that where sold or liquidated in
their entirety between 1981 and 1985. The third and final criterion was that the firm had
39 The matching of Trinet and Compustat data creates a bias toward larger firms compared to Trinet data alone.
The reason for this is that Compustat contains publicly traded firms only, while Trinet contains both. Publicly
traded firms are on average larger than privately held firms.
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entered at least one new four digit SIC-code between 1981 and 1985. This reduced the sample
to 145 firms. These 145 firms operated 4582 businesses in 724 different four digit SIC-codes
in 1981. They entered a total of 1202 industries between 1981 and 1985. exited 1118
industries. and remained in 3464 industries throughout the period.
To test our hypotheses we included all the 1202 instances of entry. but rather than using the
entire sample of non-entries. we used the random sample generator in SPSS to select a sample
of non-entries of comparable size. State based sampling has been suggested as preferable to a
pure random sample when a population is overwhelmingly characterized by one state. and
will provide unbiased and consistent coefficients for all variables except the constant term
(McFadden and Manski, 1981). Adjusting for 26 cases for which data were missing. this
resulted in a final sample of a total of 2378 observations. 1202 of which were entries. and
1176 ofwhich were non-entries.
Statistical Methods
In order to test H l-H3 we developed a model of the relationship between the probability of
entry and relatedness. which controls for industry- and parent variables that previous research
indicates may affect entry decisions. This was done to control for other potential motives for
entry than to reap the gains from relatedness. such as market power or joining a high growth
or high return industry. and to reduce the risk that the performance of one or more of the
presented relatedness measures are inflated or deflated because of associations with "other"
variables. Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable. a logistic regression
analysis was considered appropriate for testing our model. The general model is the
following:
118
P(Entry=l) = Pl + Ih(lndustry growth) + P3(Industry concentration) + p4(Industry
profitability) + P5(Parent size) + /J6(Parent diversity) + fo(Parent relatedness) + e
Industry Level Independent Variables
INDGRSAL. Industry growth is widely assumed to affect industry attractiveness favorably.
because it allows firms to grow without having to steal customers from competitors. Thus.
industry growth tends to soften competitive rivalry and raise the average profitability. Such a
relationship has been confirmed in numerous empirical studies (i.e. Kwoka and Ravenscraft.
1986; Salinger. 1984; Schmalensee. 1989). High growth may therefore function as a substitute
for close relatedness in the eyes of a decision maker who is concerned with post entry
performance. In addition. decision makers may as discussed earlier obtain private benefits
from growth. which may create a bias towards entering high growth industries. For these
reasons one would expect a positive relationship between the growth of an industry. and the
probability of entry. The variable INDGRSAL is derived byestimating the growth in percent
of industry sales between 1981 and 1985. as reported in Trinet.
INDCONC. Industry concentration has in standard 10 theory been argued to have a positive
relationship with industry profitability (Bain, 1956; Porter. 1980). The reason being that scale
economies and other sources of market power reduces the threat from potential entrants. In
addition. the risk that incumbents will undertake retaliatory actions against an entrant
increases with industry concentration. This leads us to expect a negative relationship between
industry concentration and the probability of entry. The variable INDCONC is derived by
estimating the four-firm concentration ratio of each industry for 1981. based on Trinet Data.
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lNDPROF. The relationship between entry and industry profitability is uncertain. On the one
hand an industry can only sustain high profitability if entry barriers are high (Baumol et al.,
1982). on the other hand these high levels of profitability will be attractive to potential
entrants. The net effect of industry profitability on the probability of entry is therefore
uncertain. To control for industry profitability we calculated a measure of the median return
on assets for each industry over the period 1980 - 1982. The procedure used here calls for
some elaboration. The Compustat database which was used to derive INDPROF consists of a
segment database which report ROA in four-digit SIC codes. and a corporate database which
report ROA on the finn level. We used all observations in the segment database and all single
business firms in the corporate database to calculate INDPROF. However this creates a
problem because the ROA measures are not directly comparable over these two databases.
Because of incomplete asset allocation. ROA is systematically higher in the segment
database. To preserve observations we calculated the mean of all observations in each
database for each year. and we subsequently divided each individual observation by this
mean. Thus. the individual observations were standardized as deviations in percent from the
database mean for the relevant year. This allowed us to use observations from both databases
and all three years. and we subsequently calculated the median of this measure for each
industry. Where a minimum of five observations were obtained. this was done on the level of
four digit SIC-industries. if less than five observations were obtained the same measure was
calculated on the three digit level. if still less than five observations where obtained. the
measure was calculated on the two digit level (following Berger and Ofek, 1995). We expect
a negative relationship between INDPROF and the probability of exit.
120
Firm Level Independent Variables
PARSIZE. The size of the parent has been used as an indicator of a parent's level of
financial-. managerial- and other resources. Thus it may be the case that for any given level of
relatedness. a large firm is more willing and able to undertake an entry attempt. We try to
control for this by including parent size as a control variable. We expect a positive
relationship between parent size and the probability of entry. The variable PARSIZE is
measured as the total sales of the parent in 198L based on Trinet data.
PARDIV. The number of SIC-codes a parent is active in may also be a signal of the strategy
and the motives of the parent. A parent active in numerous SIC-codes may be following a
strategy of broad or unrelated diversification. which makes it more likely that it will enter
additional unrelated industries in the future. This could for example be because the firm is
dominated by managerial motives of growth or excessive risk reduction. or because decision
makers believe that the firm possesses a special ability to create value from general resources.
and/or handle a complex organization. Thus we expect a positive relationship between
PARDIV and the probability of entry for any level of relatedness. The variable PARDIV is
measured as the number of SIC-codes participated in by the parent in 1981. based on Trinet
data.
Relatedness Variables
The survivor-based relatedness measures employed in the test of H l-H3 have been presented
above. The measures used in testing HI are called SURVTOTi and SICTOTi and capture the
sales weighted average relatedness of the target industry i to al! other businesses in the parent
k. We expect SURVTOTi to perform better than SICTOTi. Note that the prefix "SURV"
indicates a survivor-based measure. while the prefix "SIC" indicates a SIC-based measure.
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The measures used in testing H2 are called SURVNBORj, and SICNBORj and capture the
weighted relatedness between the target industry i and the two closest neighboring businesses
of the parent. We expect SURVNBORj, to perform better than SICNBORj. In testing H3 we
included all four ofthese measures. and we hypothesize that the two measures with the prefix
"SURV" will perform better than both measures with the prefix "SIC".
Dependent 1'ariable
The dependent variable used to test Hl and H2 is dichotomous. If a parent entered a four-digit
SIC code it was not present in in 1981 by 1985. the dependent variable is given a value of 1.
Ifthe parent did not enter the industry in question. the value assigned is o. The Trinet database
was used to identify entries and nonentries.
Variable definitions. datasources and predicted signs are summarized in Table 1 below. while
Table 2 shows the means. standard deviations and correlation coefficients for all independent
variables.
Insert table 1 and 2 about here
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6. Results
The results from the logistic regression analyses are presented in table 3. Table 3 contains five
different logistic regression models. Model l contains control variables only. Model 2
contains control variables plus the survivor-based measure SURVTOTj. Model 3 contains
control variables plus the equivalent SIC-based measure SICTOTj. Model 4 contains control
variables plus the survivor-based measure SURVNBORj. Model 5 contains control variables
plus the equivalent SIC-based measure SICNBORj.
Insert table 3 about here
As shown in table 3 all four relatedness measures are positively signed and significant at the
0.00 l level. This. and the substantial increases in all measures of model performance when
any measures of relatedness is included. provides strong and consistent support for the general
hypothesis that relatedness matters for pattems of diversification.
H l predicted that model 2 would explain the probability of exit significantly better than
model 3. This hypothesis is strongly supported. All measures of model performance improve
substantially when the measure SURVTOTj is substituted for SICTOTj. The model chi-
square improves from 227.26 to 744.1 an improvement which is significant at the 0.001 level.
The two pseudo z' measures increase from 9.1 % to 26.9 % (Cox and Snell r2) and from 12.2
% to 35.8 % (Nagelkerke ,.2). These increases represent improvements of approximately 195
%. In addition the ability to correctly predict entries and non-entries increased from 61A % to
74,4%. This represents an improvement in prediction of 119.2 %. We interpret these results as
strong support for Hl.
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H2 predicted that model 4 would explain the probability of exit significantly better than
model 5. This hypothesis is also strongly supported. Again. allmeasures of model
performance improve substantially when the measure SURVNBORj is substituted for
SICNBORj. The model chi-square improves from 446.38 to 714.60. an increase which is
significant at the 0.00 I level. The two pseudo r/ measures increase from 17.1 % to 26.0 %
(Cox and Snell ,.2) and from 22.8 % to 34.6 % (Nagelkerke ,)). These increases represent
improvements of approximately 52 %. Furthermore the ability to correctly predict entries and
non-entries increases from 68.2 % to 74.7 %. representing an improvement of 37 %. We
interpret these findings as strong support for H2.
H3 predicted that both survivor-based measures would perform significantly better than both
SIC-based measures. This hypothesis is supported ifthe lowest performing survivor-based
measure performs significantly better than the best performing SIC-based measure. As shown
in table 3 the lowest performing survivor-based measure is SURVNBORj while the best
performing SIC-based measure is SICNBORj. The test of H3 therefore reduces to the same
test as H2. which as noted was strongly supported. We therefore conclude that H3 is also
strongly supported.
Another noteworthy observation is the difference in performance between the two SIC-based
measures. SICNBORj outperformed SICTOTi substantially, as can be seen by a difference in
chi-square between model 3 and 5 of 219.12 which is significant at the 0.00 I level. The
pseudo ,.2 measures increase from 9J % to 17J % (Cox and Snell ,.2) and from 12.2 % to 22.8
% (Nagelkerke) as we move from model 3 to model 5. A possible reason for this finding is the
coarse grained nature of the SIC distance measures (only three different levels of vdistance").
This means that every distance between the target industry and an existing business will be
likely to include a substantialmeasurement error, due to this coarse grained scale. The
SICTOTi measure may therefore imply multiplying more noise into the measure than
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SURVNBORj. simply because the number ofdistances included is higher when the target
industry is matched to all businesses in the parent portfolio (and not only the two closest
neighbors ).
In contrast. among the survivor-based measures SURVTOTj outperformed SURVNBORj.
The difference in chi-squares among model 2 and 4 is 29.5. which is significant at the 0.0 l
level. but the differences in the pseudo ,-2 measures are quite small. One possible explanation
for the apparent superiority ofSURVTOTj over SURVNBORj is that the continuous scale
underlying the survivor-based measures means that the problem of multiplying more noise
into the measure is substantially reduced. and that the measure SURVTOTj benefits from
being able to capture relatedness effects that extend beyond the two closest related industries.
7. Conclusions and Caveats
In sum. our findings are that the survivor-based measures outperform equivalent SIC-based
measures in terms of explaining the probability of entry. Our findings also indicate support for
the hypothesis that relatedness matter for patterns of diversification. since our data shows that
relatedness significantly increases the probability of entry. However. in drawing these
conclusions some caution is warranted.
One reason for caution is that entry decisions may be influenced by other factors than
relatedness that we have not satisfactorily controlled for. The entry decisions observed here
may for example be more influenced by fashion and herd behavior than conscious attempts to
exploit relatedness (i.e. it is fashionable to enter "similar" businesses). This is both a threat to
interpreting our findings as support for the relatedness hypothesis. but more importantly, it
may be the case that the survivor-based measures perform better than the SIC-based measures
because they capture such herd behavior better. This suspicion arises because the survivor-
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based measures are based on observing the combinations chosen by other firms in the same
industries in a period recently preceding the decision period. These "neighboring" firms are
presumably the ones the focal finn would be herding atter. The data supplied here can not rule
out this possibility.
Another alternative interpretation is that the survivor-based measures outperform the SIC
based measures because of contamination from motives associated with multipoint
competition and mutual forbearance. This refers to a tendency among firms competing across
several markets to instigate a balance of terror where competition is less aggressive than it
would have been otherwise (Edwards. 1955: Gimeno. 1999: Greve and Baum, 2001). Firms
may prefer to enter industries where they will meet existing competitors as a mean towards
establishing mutual forbearance. The way the survivor-based measures are constructed makes
them particularly well suited to capture such motives. since a related industry - measured this
way - would be an industry where the firm will meet many of its existing competitors.
Future work should therefore emphasize testing both the herd behavior and the mutual
forbearance interpretation of the findings in this study. as well as testing the survivor-based
measures against other dependent variables which relatedness is supposed to affect. In
particular it would be useful to test the survivor-based measures against measures offirm
level performance. such as ROA. tobins-q and firm growth. And surely it would also be
desirable with replications using data from other periods and other places.
These important caveats not withstanding. it is our interpretation that the present findings.
particularly in combination with the results reported by Lien (2003) on exit data. strongly
suggests that survivor-based measures can make a valuable contribution to research on how
relatedness affects other variables of interest (i.e. what relatedness does). As a minimum it
would seem that the results in these two papers justify additional work on validating the
survivor-based approach to measuring relatedness.
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Survivor-based Measures of Relatedness: Two Alternative Interpretations
Abstract
Recently a survivor-based approach to measuring relatedness has been suggested as superior
to the traditional SIC-based measures. Empirical studies have found survivor-based measures
to be superior in terms of predicting both entry and exit decisions by diversified firms.
However, the existing evidence cannot rule out two rival interpretations. One is that herd
behavior constitutes an important influence on decision makers, and that the survivor-based
approach captures such unwanted influences better than SIC-based measures. Survivor-based
measures are indeed constructed from data about "what others do", and the apparent
superiority of the survivor-based measures may be an artifact oftheir ability to capture
herding tendencies. Another alternative interpretation is associated with the motive of mutual
forbearance through multi-point competition. The survivor-based measures are also
particularly well suited to capture such motives, because relatedness measured this way will
be strongly and positively correlated with multi-market contact. This paper examines whether
these "non-relatedness" explanations may account for the alleged superiority of the survivor-
based measures over SIC-based alternatives.
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1. Introduction
In two recent papers (Lien, 2003 a; Lien, 2003 b) a survivor-based approach to relatedness
was found to be superior to conventional SIC-based measures in terms of explaining entry and
exit decisions made by diversified firms. This paper explores the possibility that these
findings do not result from a better ability to capture relatedness, but from mechanisms and
motives that are unrelated to the relatedness concept. In particular there are two plausible
alternative hypotheses.
The first is associated with the impact of herd behavior (Banerjee, 1992; Scharfstein and
Stein, 1990). Given that the survivor-based approach to relatedness is built on the idea that
what is related is what firms combine often, such a measure is susceptible to falsely interpret
what is essentially mimetic- or herd behavior as an indication of (or a response to) true
relatedness. SIC-based measures, on the other hand, are not influenced by the actions of
others, and they are therefore less likely to be contaminated by such mechanisms." In short,
the observed superiority of the survivor-based measures in terms ofpredicting entry and exit
decisions may be an artifact of their ability to capture mimetic tendencies, and not due to a
superior ability to pin down relatedness.
Secondly, the survivor-based measures may be contaminated by motives related to market
power. There is a substantialliterature suggesting a relationship between multi market contact
and mutual forbearance. This refers to a tendency among firms competing across several
markets to instigate a balance of terror where competition is less aggressive than it would
have been otherwise (Edwards, 1955; Gimeno, 1999; Greve and Baum, 2001). Again, the way
the survivor-based measures are constructed makes them particularly well suited to capture
40 The SIC-based measures are based on standardized distances in the SIC-system.
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such motives, since they are indeed built from a count of frequencies of multi market contact.
One may therefore speculate that the superior ability of the survivor-based approach to
explain patterns of entry and exit is not due to relatedness, but to a particular sensitivity to the
motives of creating and exploiting benefits from mutual forbearance. SIC-based measures are
not equally sensitive to these motives, because they are not constructed on the basis of multi
market contact.
This paper examines these two alternative interpretations of the findings reported by Lien
(2003a, 2003b). The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the logic underlying the
survivor-based measures, and how different survivor-based measures are derived from this
logic. Section 3 presents the herd behavior mechanism, and develops hypotheses that test
whether herd behavior can explain the apparent superiority of the survivor-based measures.
Section 4 is an empirical test of this herd behavior reinterpretation. Section 5 presents the
mutual forbearance motive, and develops hypotheses that test whether this can account for the
apparent superiority of the survivor-based measures. Section 6 is an empirical test ofthis
mutual forbearance reinterpretation. Section 7 concludes.
2. The Survivor-based Approach to Relatedness
2.1 The Logic
The fundamental premise of the survivor-based approach to relatedness is that industries that
are related will be more frequently combined inside firms; The term "more frequently" is
operationalized byestimating how much the frequencies of actual combinations of four-digit
SIC industries inside firms deviate from what one would expect if diversification patterns
were random (Teece, Rumelt, Dosi and Winter, 1994). A given pair of industries is thus
related if the actual number of firms combining this pair of industries exceeds the number one
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would expect if firms combined industries randomly. If this difference is large and positive
they are closely related, if it is zero or negative they are unrelated.
The potential advantages of using this survivor-based approach stem from two main sources.
One is that it better incorporates the knowledge of the best informed actors which presumably
are those making portfolio decisions. Since the survivor-based approach is built from
observing the actions of those holding superior information, one may stipulate that more and
better information is reflected in these measures (i.e. a Hayekian argument). Secondly, and
equally important, even ifthe information ofthese decision makers is poor, and/or their
motives are illegitimate, their decisions have been screened by the competitive process
(Alchian, 1950). Ifthe screening process of competitive markets is efficient, poor decisions
will either be reversed, or the firm that made them willioose resources and ultimately become
extinct. This second argument relies crucially on what has been termed the survivor principle
(hence the name "survivor-based measures"). The survivor principle has as it core idea the
notion that the competitive process screens for efficiency - and does so well enough that a
sample of competitive firms will be dominated by the decisions or behaviors that are efficient
- at least in a comparative sense (Alchian, 1950:211 ).41 In this particular setting this insight is
applied to portfolio decisions, and it is assumed that the competitive process is quite effective
in removing inefficient combinations.Y
In sum, the potential advantages ofa survivor-based approach stems from better use of the
information revealed by the actions of those holding superior information, and the screening
ofthese decisions by the competitive process.
2.2 The Survivor-based Measures
41 For the view that the competitive process creates outcomes that are optimizing, cfr. Friedman (1953).
42 For critique ofthis optimistic view of the screening ability of the competitive process cfr. Hodgson (1993),
Winter (1971), Elster (1989).
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All versions of the survivor-based approach relies fundamentallyon estimates of how much
the frequencies of actual combinations of four-digit SIC industries inside firms deviate from
what one would expect if diversification patterns were random. We shall first show how this
key number is computed, before we tum to how it can be used to derive different measures of
survivor-based relatedness. The following draws heavily on Teece, Rumelt, Dosi and Winter
(1994).
Let the universe of diversified firms consist of K firms, each active in two or more of I
industries. Let Cu. = 1 if firm k is active in industry i. The number of industries participated in
by firm kis m, = LiCik and the number of diversified firms present in industry i is ni = LkCk.
Let Ji} be the number of diversified firms active in both industries i andj, such that
Ji} = Lk CkCik. Thus Ji} is a count ofhow often industries i andj are actually combined within
the same firm. li} will be larger if industries i and j are related, but will also increase with ni
and ni. To remove the effect of the size of industries i and j, the number li} is compared with
the number of expected combinations if diversification patterns were random.
The random diversification hypothesis can be operationalized as a hypergeometric situation
where a sample of size ni is drawn (without replacement) from a population of K firms. Those
chosen are considered active in industry i. A second independent sample of size ni is then
drawn from the population the population of K firms. Those chosen are considered active in
industry j. The number xi} of firms active in both i and j is then a hypergeometric random
variable with population K, special members ni and sample size ni. The distribution function
for this variable is then:
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The mean and variance of Xij are:
0'2 = Ji(I-~) (_!5_).
IJ K K-l
A standardized measure of the relatedness between industries i and i is then constructed based
on the difference between Jij and Jiij in the following fashion:
J -JiSR = I} Ij
Ij
al}
The measure SRi] is thus a standardized measure of how much actual combinations exceed
expected combinations under the random diversification hypothesis. With this fundamental
measure in hand it is possible to compute several survivor-based measures ofhow related a
given business (or a potential destination industry) is to the businesses in a given parent
portfolio. We present the three measures used by Lien (2003a, 2003b).
The first measure captures the weighted average relatedness of a business i (or a destination
industry i43) to all other businesses in the portfolio of a given parent. Assume a diversified
firm that participates in m industries. Its business in industry i has sales of Sj and survivor-
based relatedness SRijwith industry i. The weighted average relatedness SURVTOT; of the
business in industry i to all other businesses in the firm is then defined as:
The second measure does not consider how related a given business i is to all other business
in the corporate portfolio, but how related it is to the two closest neighboring businesses of the
43 In the following the term "business t" is substitutable with destination "industry i", The latter expression is
appropriate for analyses of entry decisions, while the former is appropriate for exit decisions.
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parent. The approach here is to rank the survivor-based measure SRi} between the business i,
and all other businesses in the parent portfolio. The two industries with the highest measure of
SRi} are considered the neighboring businesses. Let Åi} = 1 for a business that is defined as a
neighbor to business i, and Åi} = O for those that are not. The weighted average relatedness of
neighbors to business i is then defined by:
The third measure captures how related a business i is to the parent's core business (measured
as the largest 4-digit SIC code in terms of revenue). Let SRic be the survivor-based measure
between a given industry i, and the core business c. This measure includes consideration of
the size of the focal business (where size refers to share of the parent's total sales), and
construct it so that its value is high for large businesses close to the core business, and smaller
for a small businesses distant to the core business. This measure SURVCOREj is defined as:
2.3 Preceding Findings
To validate these survivor-based measures ofrelatedness Lien (2003a, 2003b) compared them
with parallel SIC-based measures" in terms oftheir ability to predict entry and exit decisions
by diversified firms. In Lien (2003b) the measures SURVTOT and SURNBOR were
compared with SIC-based equivalents with respect to prediction of entry decisions. Based on
relatedness measures from 1981, the ability to predict whether entry would occur between
1981 and 1985 was estimated. In Lien (2003a) the measures SURVTOT and SURVCORE
were compared with SIC based equivalents with respect to prediction of exit decisions. Based
44 The procedures for calculating SIC-based equivalents to the survivor-based measures are described in section
4.1. In general this is done by substituting distances in the SIC-system for the survivor-based measure SRij in the
formulas provided above.
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on relatedness measures from 1981 the ability to predict which businesses a diversified firm
had chosen to exit by 1985 was estimated.
In both cases (entry and exit) the survivor-based measures were found to score significantly
higher than their SIC- based equivalents on all measures ofmodel performance. Not only did
each survivor-based measure outperform its SIC-based equivalent, but all survivor-based
measures were found to outperform all SIC-based measures.
While these findings appear impressive they may be so for the wrong reasons, meaning that
they are not necessarily the result of a superior ability to measure relatedness. We now turn to
the first of two alternative interpretations of these findings.
3. AHerd Behavior Interpretation
3.1 The Logic of Herd Behavior
John Maynard Keynes was the first to suggest that herd behavior may playa role in economic
life. In The General Theory, Keynes (1936, pp. 157-58) noted the following in a passage
about the irrational behavior of investors:
"Wordly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to
succeed unconventionally"
What Keynes suggests here is that managers concerned about their reputation may choose to
follow the herd, even when their private information tells them that they should not. This
insight has been formalized by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) who demonstrate that managers
may indeed be reluctant to act according to his/her own information and beliefs, because a
bad decision is not as damaging for a manager's reputation when others make the same
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mistake. This incentive bias may produce aggregate outcomes where private information is
not efficiently used, and where decision makers converge on decisions that are not efficient.
Banerjee (1992) presents a slightly different version. He investigates a situation where each
decision maker pays heed to what other decision makers are doing, not to protect his/her
reputation with a principal or in manageriallabor markets, but because the actions of others
may reflect private information that the others have and the focal decision maker does not.
This, however, implies that each decision maker becomes less responsive to his/her own
information, and accordingly the actions of each decision maker become less informative to
others. The outcome may again be an equilibrium where private information is not efficiently
used and decision makers converge on decisions that are not efficient.
3.2 Relatedness Measures and Herd Behavior
With respect to patterns of diversification the herding mechanisms presented above implies
that decisions about which industries to combine inside a firm can be substantially influenced
by the actions of others, and not superior local knowledge about which businesses are related
to which. For example entry into a new industry may be considered less risky in terms of
managerial reputation if this creates combinations that have been chosen by many others. Or
alternatively, if a particular combination of industries has been chosen by many others, a
manager may believe that these have private information about the benefits of combining it
with one of the existing businesses.
What is important to note here is that SIC-based measures and survivor-based measures are
likely to differ with respect to contamination by herd behavior. The reason is simply that the
survivor-based approach involves measuring which combinations firms in the same industries
as the focal firm have chosen in a period recently preceding the decision period (cfr the
calculations of SRij in section 2.2). These are presumably the firms the focal firm would be
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herding after. The SIC-based approach, on the other hand, is based on standardized distances
in the SIC-system, and it plainly does not reflect what "others are doing" nearly as well. There
are for example numerous examples of industries that are close in the SIC-system, but are
never combined inside firms, and the reverse; that firms are distant in the SIC-system, but
frequently combined.
Lien (2003b) assumes that decision makers make decisions independently, and that the
propensity to enter common combinations is a result of decision makers facing similar facts
(about relatedness). However, the decision to follow suit may be driven by the herding
mechanisms just described, and not efficient use of available information. The relative
success of the survivor-based measures in terms of predicting patterns of entry reported by
Lien (2003b) may therefore arise from a superior ability to capture herd behavior and not
relatedness.
If this is the case, we would expect the survivor-based relatedness measures to display
superior performance in terms of predicting entry decisions, as Lien actually found, but not to
be superior in terms of predicting post entry performance. This means that while herd
behavior may influence entry decisions, once entry has occurred competitive forces and
economic reality sets in and begins its work of screening the good decisions from the bad. The
worse the post entry performance, the more likely that the entered business is exited again
(i.e. the entry decision is reversed). If SIC- and survivor-based measures capture true
relatedness equally well, we would expect no difference between the two approaches in terms
of predicting which of the entry decision that will subsequently be reversed. Based on this
logic we may formulate the following hypotheses.
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Hl: Survivor-based related measures are superior to SIC-based measures in terms of
predicting entry decisions
H2: Survivor-based relatedness measures are not superior to SIC-based measures in terms
of predicting post entry survival
HI was supported in Lien (2003b), but his interpretation did not include the herding
mechanisms discussed above. We shall therefore focus on testing H2, and we suggest that
support for H2 implies support for a herd behavior interpretation of the reported findings
regarding Hl. A contradiction of H2 can be considered support for the suggestion that
survivor-based measures are better able to capture relatedness than SIC-based measures, since
it means it will have withstood an attempt at falsification based on herd behavior mechanisms.
4. Testing the Herd Behavior Interpretation
4.1 Data and Methodology
Sample
The data used to test H2 is a sub-sample of the sample used by Lien (2003b).45 The full
sample used by Lien consisted of 1202 instances of entry and 1176 instances of non-entry
occurring between 1981 and 1985. Ideally we could have used all the 1202 cases of entry for
the purpose of the present work, but this was not possible for two reasons. One is that 1987
was the latest date for which we could obtain usable data regarding industry participation, and
hence could register whether a firm was still active in an entered industry. Given that we
wanted some time for the competitive process to work on the entry decisions, we felt it was
necessary to restrict the sample to entries made between 1981 and 1983. This reduced the
45 For a more detailed description ofthis sample, cfr, Lien (2003b)
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sample to 401 cases of entry. Using data from 1987 to measure post entry survival also posed
an additional challenge. The SIC-system was revised in 1987, and there is no clear cut
procedure for conversion between the two versions of the SIC-system. Fortunately, of the 913
relevant four digit SIC-codes,46 a total of 609 SIC codes went unchanged through this
revision. To avoid the possibility that the SIC-revision creates confusion regarding whether an
entry decision had been reversed, we further restricted our sample to entries into the 609
industries that were not affected by the revision. This further reduced our sample to 229
entries, all occurring between 1981 and 1983, for which their continued existence in 1987
could be unambiguously determined.
Statistical Methods
H2 involves a dichotomous dependent variable, which specifies whether an industry entered
between 1981 and 1983 had been exited by 1987. Thus a logistic regression model was
considered appropriate. The general model is the following:
P(exit=l) = Pl + P2(Relatedness) + &
Note that the purpose of the model is the relative performance of different relatedness
measures in terms of explaining the probability of an entered business being exited again. It is
not to determine the absolute values of the coefficients, nor to explain the probability of exit
per se. Including control variables will therefore not shed light on the research question posed
here unless they can be expected to correlate differently with the different relatedness
measures we are comparing. The only variable we know that may be theoretically expected to
do so is industry concentration. However this possibility will be explored in sections 5 and 6
46 SIC-codes referring to public and non-profit industries are omitted.
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ofthis paper. We therefore omit control variables in the present study, but we note that the
findings reported below did not change when controls for growth, industry profitability,
parent size, parent diversity, parent leverage and parent liquidity were included (the
regressions with control variables included are available from the author).
Independent Variables
The independent variables used in this study are the four different relatedness measures used
in Lien (2003b). The two survivor-based measures are SURVTOT and SURVNBOR, the
procedure for calculating these have been presented in section 2.2, but we reiterate that
SURVTOT measures the sales weighted average relatedness of the entered industry i to all
other industries a parent is active in. SURVNBOR captures the weighted relatedness of an
entered industry i to the two closest related industries the parent is active in. The two SIC-
based measures parallel these survivor-based measures. SICTOT is an equivalent to
SURVTOT based on SIC-distances. SICTOT is calculated as follows:
Where dij= 2
dij= 1
dij= O
if i andj are in the same 3-digit SIC codes
if i andj are in different 3-digit-, but the same 2 digit SIC codes
if i andj are in different 2-digit SIC codes
parent sales in industry j
SICNBOR is an equivalent to SURVNBOR based on SIC-distances. SICNBOR is calculated
as follows:
Where dij= 2
dij= 1
if i andj are in the same 3-digit SIC codes
if i andj are in different 3-digit-, but the same 2-digit SIC codes
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dij= O
Aij= 1
A(/=O
if i andj are in different 2-digit SIC codes
ifbusinessj is defined as a neighbor to business i47.
if business j is not defined as a neighbor to business i
Dependent Variable
As already indicated the dependent variable was whether a firm had exited an entered
business by 1987. If yes, a value of 1 was assigned, if not a value of Owas assigned. Both
divestures and closures were considered to represent exit.
Variable definitions, data source and predicted signs are summarized in Table 1 below. Table
2 shows the means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients for all four independent
variables.
Insert table 1 about here
Insert table 2 about here
4.2 Results and Discussion
The results from the regression analyses are presented in table 3. Table 3 contains four
different logistic regression analyses, one for each relatedness measure. H2 predicted that the
survivor-based measures would not outperform SIC-based measures in terms of predicting
47 Note that we resorted to the following procedure when business were equidistant from the target industry: First
we identified the closest neighbor, if several where equidistant, we used the sales of the largest business to
compute sales weights. Then we identified the second closest. Ifthere were several second closest firms, we
chose the smallest ofthese. This was done to reflect our assumption that one would expect closer cooperation
with the closest neighbor than the second closest. This procedure implies that when the closeness to the two
neighbors differed, we weighted our measure in favor of the closest of the two.
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post entry survival. As table 3 shows this hypothesis is strongly contradicted. All survivor-
based measures perform better than all SIC-based measures in terms of explaining the
probability that an entered business will be exited again. In particular we note that the
measure SURVTOT perform better than all the other measures, but SURVNBOR also
performs significantly better than SICTOT. The difference in chi-square between the models
containing these two measures is significant at the 0,01 level. The ability of the measure
SICNBOR to predict exit is not statistically significant.
Next we ran a model where both SURVTOT and SICTOT were included. The output from
this model is presented in table 4. The results show that when both are included SURVTOT
completely replaces the predictive power of SICTOT, and that SICTOT does not add any
explanatory power to the model with SURVTOT only.
insert table 3 about here
insert table 4 about here
These results contradict the suggestion that the superiority of survivor-based measures of
relatedness found in Lien (2003b) will disappear when herd behavior is taken into account.
They do not, however, indicate that herd behavior does not exist, nor that survivor-based
measures are not influenced by such tendencies. What they do suggest is that survivor-based
measures are superior to SIC-based measures in terms of capturing relatedness, and that this
seems to overshadow any noise resulting from inclusion of herding tendencies.
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5. A Mutual Forbearance Interpretation
5.1 The Logic of Mutual Forbearance
The mutual forbearance hypothesis is usually credited to Edwards (1955). This hypothesis
suggests that high levels of contact between firms across markets will induce mutual
forbearance, causing multipoint competitors to refrain from aggressively attacking each other.
The incentive to do so stems from the fact that high levels of intermarket contact enable a firm
to respond to an aggressive action by a multipoint rival in markets other than the one in which
the action takes place. This possibility raises the potential costs of aggressive moves and may
therefore induce a state of less vigorous competition than would have ocurred without
multimarket contact (Kamani and Wernerfelt, 1985).
Empirical work has supported the mutual forbearance hypothesis both with respect to patterns
of market entry and competitive outcomes. For example Scott (1989, 1991) has found that
conglomerate firms have higher levels of multimarket contact than would be expected if entry
patterns were independent. Furthermore, multimarket contact has been found to be positively
associated with higher prices (Feinberg, 1985; Evans and Kessides, 1994; Gimeno and Woo,
1996; Gimeno, 1999), higher profits (Barnett et al., 1994; Phillips and Mason, 1996) and
lower exit rates (Barnett, 1993; Baum and Kom, 1996; Baum and Kom, 1999; Baum, 1999).
It seems warranted to conclude that empirical work supports the idea that diversification may
be affected by the possibility of achieving benefits from mutual forbearance. However, it is
unclear how sensitive this strategy is to the existing (and potential) number of firms that are
not multipoint competitors in the market (Greve and Baum, 2001). Under some conditions it
may be rational for such firms to follow the less aggressive path of the forbearing firms (i.e. a
puppy dog/fat cat equilibrium, see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984; Bulow et al., 1985), while
under other conditions it may be difficult to maintain forbearance due to the threat of entry
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(Baumol et al., 1982), or because competition from such incumbents forces multipoint
competitors into vigorous competition (i.e. a prisoner's dilemma equilibrium). But while the
exact sensitivity of the mutual forbearance hypothesis to market structure is uncertain, it does
seem quite clear that mutual forbearance requires some minimum level of concentration in the
markets involved to be a plausible motive. In fragmented markets, existing or potential
competition from firms lacking the "proper" combinations of market presence are likely to
force multimarket firms into competing vigorously.
5.2 Relatedness Measures and Mutual Forbearance
The possibility of creating and exploiting gains from mutual forbearance may be relevant for
both the entry and exit decisions of diversified firms.
Firms may refrain from exiting a weak position in one industry because maintaining this
position is important to protect gains from mutual forbearance in another. Or in other words;
the firm remains in the weak business, not because it is reaping gains from relatedness, but
because remaining there is a perquisite for low levels of rivalry elsewhere. As an illustration,
assume that firm A is competing in two different industries, 1 and 2. Assume further that the
two main competitors, B and C, are also present in both industries. Firm A is considering
leaving industry 2, but may refrain from doing so for fear of being attacked by B or C in
industry 1. If this is the outcome, the decision to stay in industry 2 is not a result of
relatedness, but of an attempt to protect gains from mutual forbearance in industry 1. A
researcher studying this situation using a survivor-based measure of relatedness would
register that industries 1 and 2 are frequently combined inside firms, indicating that they are
related. Firm A's decision to stay in industry 2 may therefore falsely be interpreted as
evidence of the benefits of combining the related industries 1 and 2. Using a SIC-based
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measure reduces the risk of drawing such a false conclusion, since overlapping patterns of
industry participation is not built into the SIC-based measures.
Based on this one may speculate that the findings reported in Lien (2003a) - that survivor-
based measures are superior to SIC-based measures in terms of explaining exit decisions - is
an artifact of survivor-based measures capturing the mutual forbearance motive better, and not
evidence of a superior ability to measure relatedness. If this is the case, we would expect the
survivor-based measures to be superior in terms of predicting exit decisions involving fairly
concentrated industries (where the mutual forbearance motive is plausible), but not to exist for
industries with low concentration. We can then formulate the following hypothesis:
H3: Survivor-based measures of relatedness will outperform SIC-based measures of
relatedness in terms of predicting exit decisions when industry concentration is high,
but not when it is low
Now consider the case of entry decisions. Firms may prefer to enter industries where it will
meet existing competitors as a mean of establishing mutual forbearance. Assume for example
that firm A is currently only present in industry 1, but fears an attack by its two most
prominent competitors B and C. Assume that B and C are both competing in industry 2. One
possible avenue for discouraging an attack in industry 1 is for A to establish a foothold in
industry 2 and threaten to retaliate there. Thus the entry by A into industry 2 is not driven by
relatedness between industries 1 and 2, but to create a situation of mutual forbearance in
industry 1. Again, a researcher studying this situation using a survivor-based measure of
relatedness may conclude that industries 1 and 2 are related, and that firm A's entry decision
is driven by a desire to exploit this relatedness. Using a SIC-based measure reduces the risk of
151
drawing such a false conclusion, since overlapping patterns of industry participation is not an
element in the construction of the SIC-based measures.
Based on this one may speculate that the findings reported in Lien (2003b) - that survivor-
based measures are superior to SIC-based measures in terms of explaining entry decisions -
results from survivor-based measures capturing the mutual forbearance motive better, and not
a superior ability to measure relatedness. If this is the case, we would expect the survivor-
based measures to be superior in terms of predicting entry decisions involving fairly
concentrated industries (where the mutual forbearance motive is plausible), but not to exist for
industries with low concentration (where the mutual forbearance motive is not plausible). We
can thus formulate the following hypothesis:
H4: Survivor-based measures of relatedness will outperform SIC-based measures of
relatedness in terms of predicting entry decisions when industry concentration is high,
but not when it is low
6. Testing the Mutual Forbearance Hypothesis
6.1 Data and Methodology
Samples
The data used to test H3 and H4 are the same samples as were used by Lien (2003a and
2003b), which is advantageous because it allows us to keep everything constant but the
variable of interest - which as noted in H3 and H4 is the level of industry concentration.
The exit sample used to test H3 is described in greater detail in Lien (2003a), but we note
here that this sample consists of 593 instances of exit and 598 instances of randomly chosen
nonexits made between 1981 and 1985. The total sample thus includes a total of 1191
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observations. These were obtained from 70 different parent firms that had sales exceeding $
20 millions in 1981, that were not liquidated in their entirety between 1981 and 1985, that had
data in both the Trinet and Compustat data files, and where undisputable matches between the
two databases could be obtained.
The entry sample used to test H4 is described in greater detail in Lien (2003b). It consists of
1202 instances of entry and 1176 instances of non-entry (randomly chosen) occurring
between 1981 and 1985. The total sample thus consists of 2378 observations, representing
145 parent firms. The criteria for selection were the same as for the exit sample with the
exception of minimum sales being set to $ 10millions (in 1981).
Statistical Methods
To test H3 and H4 we divided both the exit- and the entry samples into two equally sized
subsamples, one containing the most concentrated industries and one containing the least
concentrated industries. We then reran the logistic regression analyses performed by Lien
(2003a and 2003b) to examine whether his findings hold for both the high- and low
concentration subsamples. The general model for the logistic regression analyses were the
following:
P(Exit=l) = Pl + p2(Industry growth) + P3(Industry concentration) + p4(Industry profitability)
+ P5(Parent size) + P6(Parent market share) + P7(Parent leverage) +P8(Parent liquidity) + P9
(Parent relatedness) + e
P(Entry=l) = Pl + p2(Industry growth) + P3(1ndustry concentration) + p4(Industry
profitability) + P5(Parent size) + P6(Parent diversity) + P7(Parent relatedness) + &
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Independent Variables
Testing whether the findings in Lien (2003a and 2003b) hold for both the high and low
concentration subsamples dictates that the independent variables are held constant, so we use
exactly the same variables as did he.
The test ofH3 (the exit sample) involves four different independent variables, two survivor-
based measures (SURVTOT and SURVCORE), and a SIC-based equivalent to each ofthese,
SICTOT and SICCORE respectively. The first oftheses pairs, SURVTOT and SICTOT have
already been defined in section 2.2 (SURVTOT) and section 4.1 (SICTOT), see also Lien
(2003a). As noted these measure the weighted average relatedness of an industry i to all other
industries participated in by the parent, based on survivor- and SIC-measures respectively.
The second ofthese pairs, SURVCORE and SICCORE, measure how related a business i is to
the core business c of the parent, where the core business is defined as the largest 4-digit SIC
code in terms of sales. The measure SURVCORE was also defined in section 2.2 above,
which leaves only SICCORE undefined. SICCORE is defined in the following manner:
SICCORE, = die :'i
LJ,S,
Where d;c= 3 ifi = c
if j =F c and i and c are in the same 3-digit SIC codes
d;c= 1 if i andj are in different 3-digit SIC-codes, but similar 2-digit SIC codes
if i and c are in different 2-digit SIC codes
The test ofH4 (the entry sample) also involves four different independent variables. Two
survivor-based measures (SURVTOT and SURVNBOR) and their respective SIC-based
equivalents (SICTOT and SICNBOR). All ofthese have been defined in sections 2.2 and 4.1
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ofthis paper, but we restate that the variables with the suffix -NBOR measure the weighted
relatedness of a given business i to the two closest neighboring businesses of the parent (see
also Lien 2003b).
Control Variables
To keep as much as possible constant when comparing the present findings to the original
studies by Lien, we use exactly the same control variables as did he. In the interest ofbrevity,
and since the behavior of the control variables is not the issue of interest here, we will not
conduct a detailed discussion of control variables." The control variables included are:
INDGRSAL. The growth in percent ofindustry sales between 1981 and 1985. Source: Trinet
INDCONC. Four firm concentration ratio for 1981. Source: Trinet
INDPROF. Median ROA for each industry over the period 1980-1982. Source:Compustat
MKTSH. Firm sales in industry i as percent of industry sales in 1981. Source: Trinet
PARSIZE. Total sales ofparent in 1981 Source: Trinet
PARDIV. Number offour digit SIC-codes participated in by a parent in 1981. Source: Trinet
PARLEV. Long term debt to market value in 1981. Source: Compustat
PARLIQ. Ratio of current assets to current liabilities in 1981. Source: Compustat
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable involved in testing H3 is exit. If a parent active in a four-digit SIC
code in 1981 has exited this industry by 1985, the dependent variable is given a value of l. If
the parent is still active in the industry, the value assigned is O. Both divestures and closures
are thus considered to represent exit.
48 We refer to Lien (2003a and 2003b) for a more detailed discussion of the control variables
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The dependent variable involved in testing H4 is entry. If a parent entered a four-digit SIC
code it was not present in in 1981 by 1985, the dependent variable is given a value of 1. If the
parent the parent did not enter the industry in question, the value assigned is O.
6.2 Results and Discussion
H3 stated that the superior performance of the survivor-based measures in terms of predicting
exit would only hold for the high concentration sample. Table 5 shows the logistic regression
outputs for both the high and low concentration subsamples. The regression results strongly
contradict H3. Not only does the superiority of the survivor-based measures hold for both the
high and low concentration subsamples, it is actually stronger for the low concentration
sample than for the high concentration sample. While this can be seen from all the reported
measures of model performance, it is perhaps most clearly visible from the comparisons of
changes in model chi-square as we move from model2 to model3 and from model4 to model
5. These changes in model chi-square are not only positive and highly significant for both
subsamples, but they are actually larger for the low concentration subsample than for the high
concentration subsample. This is in stark contrast to H3, and leads us to conclude that the
superior performance of the survivor-based measures ofrelatedness found by Lien (2003a) is
not explained by contamination from mutual forbearance motives.
H4 made a similar prediction to H3 only it relates to data on entry - not exit. In other words it
states that the superior performance of the survivor-based measures in terms of predicting
entry would only hold for the high concentration sample. Table 6 shows the logistic
regression outputs for both the high and low concentration subsamples. The regression results
strongly contradict H4. The pattern is again that not only does the superiority of the survivor-
based measures hold for both subsamples, it is even stronger for the low concentration sample
than for the high concentration sample. This is also quite inconsistent with the suggestion that
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the superior performance of the survivor-based measures is a result of unintended
contamination by mutual forbearance motives.
In sum, the strong contradiction ofboth H3 and H4 does seem to rule out the interpretation
that the superior performance of the relatedness measures found by Lien (2003a, 2003b) is
explained by mutual forbearance effects. It does not, however, indicate that mutual
forbearance does not exist, nor that survivor-based measures are uninfluenced by mutual
forbearance motives. What these findings do seem to suggest is that any such noise in the
survivor-based measures is probably small compared to their ability to better capture actual
relatedness.
7. Conclusions
For empirical research on corporate strategy to advance, a crucial challenge is to find better
ways of measuring the key theoretical constructs. Few if any constructs are more central
theoretically than relatedness, and few if any measurement procedures have been more
heavily criticized than those used to capture relatedness (Fan and Lang, 2000; Markides and
Williamson 1994, 1996; Robins and Wiersma 1995, 2003; Silverman, 1999). The survivor-
based approach does surely not represent the end of this discussion, but the results by Lien
(2003a, 2003b) along with those reported in the present paper does strongly suggest that the
survivor-based approach represents a step forward in comparison with the conventional SIC-
based measures.
The contribution of this paper has been to examine whether the superior ability of the
survivor-based measures to explain the entry and exit decisions of diversified firms could be
spurious, resulting from a correlation between survivor-based measures and other influences
on behavior than that of exploiting relatedness. En ante, the two most likely candidates to do
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so are the herd behavior mechanism - and motives related to mutual forbearance. The reason
being that the way the survivor-based measures are constructed makes them well suited to
capture such effects. However, the data reported here shows no sign that such spuriousness is
an important source of noise in the survivor-based measures, and they strongly contradict any
suggestion that their apparent superiority over the SIC-based alternatives is entirely caused by
this.
Having said this, we do not claim to given definite proof of the superiority of the survivor-
based approach. Itwould still be desirable to complement the existing evidence with data
from other periods, and to validate the survivor-based measures against other dependent
variables than entry and exit. A logical next step could for example be to use performance
data, such as revenue growth, return on assets, Tobins q or other measures ofmarket value,
and examine whether survivor-based measures explain more of the variation in these variables
than rival measures ofrelatedness. The importance of the relatedness concept along with the
encouraging evidence accumulated so far should make such additional efforts well worth their
while.
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CLOSING REMARKS
The very first words in this thesis (the foreword) stated that learning was the desired output.
At this stage it seems natural to take stock, not of my own learning, but of what if anything
the thesis has added to the field( s) of inquiry addressed.
Unfortunately, under a Popperian view of science we cannot ultimately say we know anything
in general from empirical evidence. However, empirical evidence can make us less unsure
about claims of knowledge. So what are we less unsure about after this work has been
completed?
It is my opinion that we can be less unsure about the validity of relying on the SP as an
empirical strategy in research on corporate diversification. We can also be less unsure about
the validity of the existing research in corporate strategy that has employed the SP. We
cannot, however, generalize this to say that relying on the SP is OK in any setting or for
studying any issue. On the other hand the fact that the SP did survive testing in the context of
corporate diversification should somewhat increase the a priori probability that it is valid in
related areas - such as for example the study ofvertical integration (where it is also commonly
applied). On the other hand it is pertinent to repeat the call for more testing of the robustness
of the SP. For example, one may argue that even though it seems valid in a large economy
such as the US, it may not be equally valid in, say, Norway. And one may further argue that
even though the findings supplied here indicate that it is valid for the private sector as a
whole, there may be industries or settings within the private sector where it does not hold. Put
differently, we have done more in terms ofvalidating the SP for use on large inter-industry
samples than for smaller intra-industry samples.
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The second question raised was whether the SP could be useful for overcoming the problem
of measuring relatedness. If we consider the starting point as one of complete ignorance as to
whether the answer to this question is yes or no, we have gradually become less uncertain in
the direction of an affirmative answer. Fortunately (or unfortunately) the benchmark in terms
of the quality of existing measures is not of the toughest. Basically, what the three papers on
this issue have done is putting obstacles in the way of those holding the opposite opinion. By
demonstrating a superior ability to explain entry and exit decisions, antagonists have to find
counterarguments consistent with these findings. And controlling for herd behavior and
mutual forbearance interpretations, we have made the task of finding alternative
interpretations that fit the data even more difficult. But difficult is not the same as impossible.
There are still explanations that could fit the data, and not lead to the conclusion that the
survivor-based approach is superior in terms of capturing relatedness. One candidate could be
institutional theory (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983), where social and cultural pressures in
combination with a need for legitimacy may cause behavior consistent with our data. And
surely there may be other explanations that fit the data.
As always, the solution seems to lie in more empirical testing, and as repeatedly stated, the
next logical step is to evaluate the survivor-based measures with respect to other measures of
performance (such as ROA, tobins q, growth, etc.).
Are these findings important? Given that the hallmark of the scientific method is the idea of
testing claims of knowledge against data, it is crucial that the data analyzed can speak to the
truth of the hypotheses tested. Ifthe SP was invalid, it would mean that a substantial amount
of the data we have collected in industrial organization, organizational economics and
strategic management was of questionable relevance for the hypotheses (about efficiency)
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they were meant to test. Hence, a contribution that seeks to reduce the uncertainty about the
validity of the SP is not trivial. The test supplied here is the first explicit attempt to do so.
The search for better ways of solving the problem of measuring relatedness is important for
the same reason. Claims of knowledge about the effects of relatedness on various other
variables hang in the open as long as we cannot agree on whether relatedness has been
captured by the measurement procedures used. Given the prominence of the relatedness
variable, this problem is an important one for advancing knowledge about corporate strategy.
Contributions towards solving this problem should therefore be welcome in the field. The
survivor-based approach analyzed here is dramatically different from all other measures, and
it has not been evaluated previously. This in combination with the promising findings
contained in this thesis should be of some interest for future empirical research.
Finally, we note that the survivor-based approach may be used to overcome other
measurement problems in other areas of research. Stigler, for example, has used the SP in
studying economies of scale (Stigler, 1968). There are probably other undiscovered uses of
the SP as well. This, however, shall be left for others to explore. This thesis ends here.
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